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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 In Troxel v. Granville, in 2000,1 four United States (U.S.) Supreme 
Court justices determined that the “liberty interests of parents in the care, 
custody, and control of their children” (herein childcare interests) generally 
foreclose states from compelling grandparent visitation over parental 
objections.2 Yet the four recognized that “special factors” might justify 
judicial interference as long as a parent’s contrary wishes were accorded “at  
least some special weight.”3  The plurality, and one concurring justice, 
reserved the question of whether any “nonparental” visitation order must 
                                                                                                                           
*  Professor Emeritus, Northern Illinois University College of Law.  B.A., Colby College, J.D., The 
University of Chicago.  Thanks to Amanda Beveroth for her research assistance.  All errors are 
mine.    
1.  Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000).  These liberty interests had earlier commanded a majority 
support on the U.S. Supreme Court.  See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982). 
2.  Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65 (“perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this 
Court”) and at 68 (“so long as a parent adequately cares for his or her children (i.e., is fit), there will 
normally be no reason for the State to inject itself into the private realm of the family to further 
question the ability of that parent to make the best decisions concerning the rearing of that parent’s 
children”) (J. O’Connor, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Ginsburg and Breyer) 
[hereinafter plurality opinion].  On analyzing plurality opinions, see Donald Leo Bach, The Rapanos 
Rap: Grappling With Plurality Decisions, 81 U.S.L.W. 468 (2012). 
3.  Troxel, 530 U.S. at 70 (plurality opinion) (“if a fit parent’s decision of the kind at issue here becomes 
subject to judicial review, the court must accord at least some special weight to the parent’s own 
determination”).  One “special weight” case is In re H.A., 2013 WL 6576528 (Ohio App. 2d 2013) 
(rejecting mother’s objections to maternal grandmother’s visitation as objections only founded on 
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“include a showing of harm or potential harm to the child.”4  The concurring 
justice did hint, however, that at least some nonparental visitation could be 
based solely on a preexisting “substantial relationship” between a child and 
a nonparent and on “the State’s particular best interests standard.”5   
A dissenter, not unlike the concurring justice, observed that a best 
interests standard might be constitutional where the nonparent acted “in a 
caregiving role over a significant period of time,”6 hinting that such a 
nonparent might even be afforded “de facto” parent status.7  A second 
dissenter noted the possibility of both “gradations” of nonparents8 and 
carefully crafted state law definitions of parents.9  A third dissenter observed 
nonparents seeking visitation must be distinguished by whether there is a 
“presence or absence of some embodiment of family.”10   
So, parental objections to nonparental childcare (including parenting 
time, visitation and custody11) are not always dispositive.12  Yet because the 
U.S. Supreme Court has said little about nonparent childcare since Troxel, 
                                                                                                                           
4.  Troxel, 530 U.S. at 73 (plurality opinion) (“we do not consider . . . whether the Due Process Clause 
requires all nonparental visitation statutes to include a showing of harm or potential harm to the 
child as a condition precedent to granting [nonparent] visitation”).  See also id. at 77 (“there is no 
need to decide whether harm is required”) (J. Souter, concurring in the judgment). 
5.  Id. at 76-77 (while not every nonparent should be capable of securing visitation upon demonstrating 
a child’s best interests, perhaps a nonparent who establishes “that he or she has a substantial 
relationship with the child” should be able to petition if the state chooses) (J. Souter).   
6.  Id. at 98-99 (“Cases are sure to arise . . . in which a third party, by acting in a caregiving role over a 
significant period of time, has developed a relationship with a child which is not necessarily subject 
to absolute parental veto . . .  In the design and elaboration of their visitation laws, States may be 
entitled to consider that certain relationships are such that to avoid the risk of harm, a best interests 
standard can be employed by their domestic relations courts in some circumstances.”) (Kennedy, J., 
dissenting).  
7.  Id. at 100-01 (“a fit parent’s right vis-à-vis a complete stranger is one thing; her right vis-à-vis 
another parent or a de facto parent may be another”) (Kennedy, J.). 
8.  Id. at 92-93 (“Judicial vindications of ‘parental rights’ . . . requires . . . judicially defined gradations 
of other persons (grandparents, extended family, adoptive family in an adoption later found to be 
invalid, long-term guardians, etc.) who may have some claim against the wishes of the parents.”) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting). 
9.  Id. at 92-93 (“Judicial vindication of ‘parental rights’ . . . requires . . . a judicially crafted definition 
of parents”) (Scalia, J.). 
10.  Id. at 88 (Stevens J.). 
11.  Childcare herein encompasses court-recognized (as per agreement or judicial determination in the 
absence of agreement) care, custody and/or control of children within the liberty interests of parents 
under Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65, whether or not court recognition of childcare is on behalf of parents or 
nonparents.  Beyond current American state statutory authorizations for court-recognized custody, 
visitation and/or parenting time, see AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, Principles of the Law of Family 
Dissolution: Analysis and Recommendations, § 2.03 (adopted May 16, 2000) (defining a “parenting 
plan” as allocating “custodial responsibility and decisionmaking responsibility on behalf of a child,” 
which include “caretaking functions” and the broader “parenting functions”) [hereinafter “ALI 
Principles”]. 
12.  Comparably, one parent’s objection to placement for adoption is not always dispositive when the 
other parent agrees and placement clearly and convincingly serves the child’s best interests. See, 








there is much uncertainty.13  While some state legislatures have extensively 
refined their grandparent visitation statutes,14 many have not fully addressed 
the childcare interests of other nonparents,15 like stepparents. Without 
statutes, judges are left to resolve the import of a “caregiving role over a 
significant period of time” by a nonparent.  Some state legislatures and courts 
since Troxel have recognized parental child caretaking interests in 
nonbiological and nonadoptive caretakers16 by deeming them parents 
sometime after birth through such doctrines17 as de facto parent,18 in loco 
                                                                                                                           
13.  One distinguished commentator described Troxel this way: 
Troxel did more to confuse than clarify the law in the area of grandparents’ rights laws.  
On the one hand, the case can be read broadly as reaffirming that parents have a 
fundamental right to control the upbringing of their children and as providing a basis for 
invalidating orders for grandparent visitation over the objection of fit parents.  On the 
other hand, Troxel can be read as a very narrow decision that involved a particularly 
broad law applied in a situation where the parent was fit and regular grandparent 
visitation still occurred.  The absence of a majority opinion makes it even more difficult 
to assess the impact of the decision other than the certainty that it will lead to challenges 
to grandparents’ rights law throughout the country.  See e.g., Troxel, 530 U.S. 57. 
14.  The Illinois judicial and legislative response to Troxel is described in Michael A. Goldberg, Over 
the River and Through the Woods—Again:  The New Illinois Grandparent Visitation Act, 29 S. ILL. 
U. L.J. 403 (2005) (reviewing other American state responses to Troxel).  Grandparent visitation 
statutes are listed in Robyn L. Ginsberg, Grandparents’ Visitation Rights: The Constitutionality of 
New York’s Domestic Relations Law Section 72 After Troxel v. Granville, 65 ALB. L. REV. 205, 205 
n.2 (2001), while the post-Troxel state cases on the constitutionality of such statutes are reviewed in 
Sonya C. Garza, The Troxel Aftermath: A Proposed Solution for State Courts and Legislatures, 69 
LA. L. REV. 927 (2009).  It should be noted that some grandparent childcare statutes may only apply 
to certain, and thus not all, grandparents.  See, e.g., MICH. COMP. Laws 722.27b(5) (2012) 
(grandparenting time sought by one whose child/the parent is deceased or has had parental rights 
terminated), applied in Porter v. Hill, 836 N.W.2d 247 (Mich. App. 2013) (urging statutory 
amendment so that parental rights termination did not arise due to abuse or neglect). 
15.  See, e.g., Solangel Moldonado, When Father (or Mother) Doesn’t Know Best: Quasi-Parents and 
Parental Deference After Troxel v. Granville, 88 IOWA L. REV. 865 (2003) [hereinafter 
“Moldonado”]. 
16.  Parentage for grandparents and other relatives arises, in part, because of the 2008 federal Fostering 
Connections Act, 42 U.S.C. 671(a)(29) (2012) (within 30 days of removal of child from parental 
custody, state must exercise “due diligence to identify and provide notice to all adult grandparents 
and other relatives” and explain options involving kinship guardianship).  See, e.g., UTAH CODE 
78A-6-307(7), 18(c) (2012) (when a child removed from parental custody, preference for placement 
of the child shall be given to “a relative of the child”).  See also Judith T. Younger, Families Now: 
What We Don’t Know Is Hurting Us, 40 HOFSTRA L. REV. 719, 722, 733 (2012) (“glaring need for 
reliable data” on “what is really happening in intimate relationships”). 
17.  See, e.g., Maldonado, supra, note 15 at 893-97 (demonstrating how Troxel allows visitation/custody 
petitions by certain nonparents).  At times, these doctrines could be used where the nonparents have 
no intimate, unitary or quasimarital familial relationships with one or both parents, but where there 
are quasiparent relationships with the children with for whom they seek custody or visitation. See, 
e.g., E.C. v. J.V., 202 Cal. App. 4th 1076, 136 Cal. Rptr. 3d 339 (Cal. App.3d 2012). 
18.  See, e.g., In re Custody of B.M.H., 315 P.3d 470, 472 (Wash.  2013) (common law de facto parentage 
claim was available to former stepparent where the child had only one existing fit parent as the 
biological father died during the pregnancy; court noted that a similar claim was made available in 
an earlier case to a former same sex female partner of a birth mother); KY. REV. STAT. 403.270 
(statutory “de facto custodian”). Some grandparents can achieve de facto parent status under statute. 
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parentis,19 equitable parent,20 equitable estoppel,21 and “psychological 
parent.”22  Others have not.23   
In Illinois, the “liberty interests of parents” are reflected in the “superior 
rights doctrine,” which holds, as elsewhere,24 that parents have superior 
rights regarding the care of their children.25  This doctrine is incorporated 
into some Illinois statutes, as when childcare may be afforded to a nonparent 
                                                                                                                           
are de facto parents where, pursuant to CAL. FAMILY CODE 3041(c), they provide “a stable 
placement” of their grandchild by “fulfilling both the child’s physical needs and . . . psychological 
needs . . . for a substantial period of time,” even where the parent has not been found unfit or to have 
abandoned the child). 
19.  See, e.g., In re Smith, 97 So. 3d 43, 48 (Miss. 2012) (in loco parentis status, with possible visitation 
or custody rights, can be accorded maternal grandparents only where there is “a clear showing of 
abandonment, desertion or unfitness on the part of the parent”).  But see, Strauss v. Tushman, 216 
P.3d 370, 373 (Utah App. 2009) (former stepfather’s in loco parent status ends with divorce and 
mother’s objection to continued contact); Rohmiller v. Hart, 811 N.W.2d 585, 593-4 (Minn. 2012) 
(a maternal aunt could assume in loco parentis status, though not proven here).   
20.  See, e.g., Lipnevicius v. Lipnevicius, 2012 WL 3318584 (Mich. App. 2012) (equitable parent 
doctrine, adopted in Atkinson v. Atkinson, 408 N.E.2d 516 (Mich. App. 1987), cannot be used by 
former husband of child’s mother where his marital presumption of paternity was earlier rebutted 
and where the natural father had been judicially declared the father under law). 
21.  See, e.g., Juanita A. v. Kenneth N., 930 N.E.2d 214, 217 (N.Y. 2010) (“putative father could assert 
equitable estoppel defense when sued by natural mother for child support if mother acquiesced in 
the development of a close relationship between the child and another father figure and when the 
disruption of that relationship would be detrimental to the child’s interests”); In re Elizabeth S., 94 
A.D. 3d 606 (N.Y. App. 1st 2012) (in certain circumstances, including “operative parent-child 
relationship,” equitable estoppel can bar a man from denying paternity of a nonmarital child with 
whom he has no genetic ties). 
22.  See, e.g., In re M.W., 292 P.3d 1158, 1161 (Colo. App. 2012) (construing COLO. STAT. 14-10-123(1) 
allowing the pursuit of an allocation of parental responsibilities for a child in one who had physical 
care of the child for six months or more and who pursues within six months of the termination of 
such care). 
23.  See, e.g., In re I.E., 997 N.E.2d 358, 362 (Ind. App. 2013) (statutory authorization for third party, or 
nonparent, visitation only for stepparents or grandparents; foster parent visitation authority should 
arise, if at all, in legislative, not judicial forum).  At times, common law rulings are made even 
though legislation is preferred.  See, e.g., K.E.M. v. P.C.S., 38 A.3d 798, 811 (Pa. 2012) (J. Melvin, 
concurring) (affirming “the continuing viability of the (paternity by) estoppel doctrine in 
Pennsylvania common law” though believing “the General Assembly should consider the creation 
of relevant legislation”). 
24.  See, e.g., Smith v. Smith, 97 So.2d 43, 46 (Miss. 2012) (“natural-parent presumption or preference”); 
Shorty v. Scott, 535 P.2d 1341, 1344 (N.M. 1975) (“parental preference doctrine”); In re 
Guardianship of Reena D., 163 N.H. 107, 111 (N.H. 2011) (“fit parents are presumed to act in the 
best interest of their children,” adopting the Troxel plurality’s ruling; joining a majority of 
jurisdictions, court finds the presumption applies in a proceeding to terminate a guardianship by 
consent as there is no necessary waiver of parental interests with such a guardianship).  Once there 
has been a judicial determination of custody in a nonparent, the parent can no longer rely on the 
superior rights doctrine to regain custody.  See, e.g., R.W. v. D.S., 85 So.3d 1005 (Ala. Civ. App. 
2011) (parent must then show custody modification materially promotes the child’s best interests). 
25.  See, e.g., In re Marriage of Mancine, 2012 IL App (1st) 111138, ¶ 15 (citing In re R.L.S., 218 Ill.2d 
428, 434, 844 N.E.2d 22 (2006)).  Before Troxel, parental rights to childrear in Illinois, when 
challenged by nonparents, seemingly were less superior. See, e.g., Cebrzynski v. Cebrzynski, 63 
Ill.App.3d 66, 379 N.E.2d 713 (1st Dist. 1978) (as both stepmother and natural mother were fit 
parents after father’s death, joint and mutual custody in both mothers, with actual physical custody 








“only if” the child “is not in the physical custody” of a parent26 and as when 
“reasonable visitation privileges” may only be afforded a stepparent who has 
lived with the child for at least five years.27 
The Illinois superior rights doctrine was employed in 2012 to deny 
childcare opportunities to a former stepfather over maternal objection in the 
case of In re Marriage of Mancine.28  There, the stepfather allegedly 
assumed, with the mother, “a caregiving role over a significant period of 
time.”29  There was an explicit rejection of a de facto parent doctrine.30    
In reviewing Troxel, Mancine, and other American state approaches, 
this article will focus on former stepparent childcare opportunities over 
parental objection in Illinois.31  It will urge broader opportunities be 
recognized,32 especially where there is but one parent under law.  Preferably 
expansion would come via new special statutes on stepparents.  Expansion 
could also come via new general statutes expanding the definitions of legal 
parenthood or of nonparents eligible to seek childcare.  Without imminent 
General Assembly action, it will urge incremental common law expansions 
of stepparent childcare opportunities. 
                                                                                                                           
26.  750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/601(b)(2). 
27.  750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/607(b)(1.5) (if “the child is at least 12 years old” and has lived with the 
parent and stepparent for at least 5 years). 
28.  Mancine, 2012 IL App (1st) 111138, ¶ 15. A recent comparable case (though the opposite sex couple 
never married and the child was adopted by the mother in Slovakia), relying on Mancine, is In re 
Scarlett Z.-D., 975 N.E.2d 755, 764 (Ill. App. 2d 2012) “We agree with the reasoning and the holding 
of Mancine.”).  An earlier comparable case involving a lesbian relationship and a child born of 
artificial insemination is In re C.B.L., 723 N.E.2d 316 (Ill. App. 1st 1999). 
29.  Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 98-99 (2000) (Kennedy, J.). 
30.  Mancine, 2012 IL App (1st) 111138, ¶¶ 15-23.  See also id. at ¶ 39 (“we note the Illinois Supreme 
Court has specifically held that no liberty interest exists with respect to a child’s psychological 
attachment to a nonbiological parent,” citing In re Marriage of Simmons, 355 Ill. App. 3d 942, 956 
(1st Dist. 2005), which itself cited In re Petition of Kirchner, 469 N.E.2d 324 (Ill. 1995)). 
31.  Herein a stepparent generally refers only to one in or formerly in a state-recognized relationship 
(e.g., marriage, civil union, or domestic partnership) with a parent of a child born before the 
relationship with whom the stepparent has no genetic ties, thus excluding a present or earlier 
cohabitant with a parent.  Compare Surles v. Mayer, 48 Va. App. 146 (2006) (mother’s former 
boyfriend treated like a “former stepparent” under the statute on child visitation standing, Virginia 
Code 20-124.1).  A stepparent could also be one in a relationship with a parent at the time a child is 
born, whose presumed parentage (due to presumed genetic ties) has been disestablished but who 
continues to live with the parent and child.  See, e.g., In re Marriage of Purcell, 355 Ill. App. 3d 851 
(4th Dist. 2005). 
32.  The paper will explore stepparent childcare for children whether or not born of sex.  In Illinois, for 
children born of assisted reproduction, there are both general statutory provisions, 750 ILL. COMP. 
STAT. 40/1 et seq., and special provisions governing surrogacy agreements, 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
47/1 et seq.  Only for children born of sex has the U.S. Supreme Court recognized automatic parental 
status/childrearing rights in most childbearing mothers and paternity opportunity interests in most 
copulating fathers (where adulterous men may, in an American state’s discretion, not have such 
interests should the mothers and their husbands wish to childcare together).  See, e.g., Lehr v. 
Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983); Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 130.  This examination 
encompasses children born of sex to married people and civil unionized people, as well as to 
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II. PARENTAL CHILDCARE RIGHTS AND THEIR LIMITS UNDER 
TROXEL 
Brad Troxel committed suicide in May 1993, leaving behind two 
daughters whose mother, Tommie Granville, had separated from Brad in 
June 1991.33  Upon separation, Tommie retained residential custody.34 Before 
his death, Brad lived in the home of his parents, Gary and Jennifer Troxel, 
where he regularly brought the girls for weekend visits.35  At first, Jennifer 
and Gary continued to see their grandchildren on a regular basis after Brad’s 
death, but in October 1993, Tommie limited their visitation to one short visit 
per month.36 
Gary and Jennifer then petitioned for additional visits37 under a 
Washington statute that arose due to the “changing realities of the American 
family.”38  The trial court ordered the grandparents have visitation one 
weekend per month, one week during the summer, and four hours on both of 
the grandparents’ birthdays.39 
The trial court found authority for the visits in a statute which declared 
“any person may petition the court for visitation rights at any time” and “the 
court may order visitation rights for any person when visitation may serve 
the best interest of the child whether or not there has been a change of 
circumstances.”40  The trial judge made (what the Troxel plurality called) 
“slender findings”41 in concluding that grandparent visitation was in the 
children’s best interests. 
The appellate court reversed on nonconstitutional grounds, holding the 
grandparents lacked statutory standing.42  The Washington high court 
affirmed on different grounds,43 focusing on the failure of the statute to 
require a showing of harm to the child to justify a nonparent visitation order 
over parental objection, as well as on the broad statutory authorization of 
“any person” at “any time” to petition for visitation rights subject only to a 
                                                                                                                           
33    Troxel, 530 U.S. at 60. 
34.  Id. 
35.  Id. 
36.  Id. at 60-61. 
37.  Id. at 61. 
38.  Id. at 64 (“Persons outside the nuclear family are called upon with increasing frequency to assist in 
the everyday tasks of child rearing,” especially in single parent households). 
39.  Id. at 61.  The grandparents had sought two weekends of overnight visits while Tommie proposed 
one day of visitation a month with no overnight stays.  Id. 
40.  Id.; See also id at 73 (WASH. REV. CODE 26.10.160(3)). 
41.  Troxel, 530 U.S. at 72 (In fact, the Superior Court made only two formal findings in support of its 
visitation order.  First, the Troxels are part of a large, central, loving family, all located in the area, 
and the Troxels can provide “opportunities for the children in the areas of cousins and music.”  
Second, the children would be benefitted from spending quality time with the Troxels, provided that 
that time is balanced with the children’s nuclear family).  
42.  Id. at 62 (under Wash. Rev. Code 26.10.160(3), no standing unless a custody action was pending). 








best-interests-of-the-child standard.  Each rationale was said to make the 
statute facially inconsistent with the federal constitution.44   
In a challenge in the U.S. Supreme Court by Tommie on substantive 
due process grounds involving her liberty interests as a parent,45 the Troxel 
plurality described parental liberty interests as “perhaps the oldest of the 
fundamental liberty interests.”46  Supporting precedents involved the rights 
of parents “to direct the upbringing” of their children,47 to “establish a home 
and bring up children,”48 and to maintain “broad . . . authority over minor 
children.”49 
Six U.S. Supreme Court justices agreed that the Washington statute was 
unconstitutional.  Justice O’Connor, for four justices, found the Washington 
statute unconstitutional as applied.50  Justices Souter and Thomas found 
facial invalidity in separate concurring opinions.51 
Washington’s third-party visitation statute was problematic because it 
effectively permitted any third party to petition a court to review any parent’s 
decision concerning child visitation under a best interests standard.52  The 
Troxel plurality held the “breathtakingly broad” statute was unconstitutional 
because it failed to presume that fit parents act in the best interests of their 
children, or to give any deference to parental decisions.53 A judicial 
determination of a child’s best interest cannot warrant court-ordered 
visitation when the law accords no “special weight” to parental decisions 
since the federal constitution embodies “a presumption that fit parents act in 
the best interests of their children.”54  The Troxel plurality hinted that 
nonparent visitation orders over parental objections would be constitutional 
when “special weight” is accorded parental wishes.55  The Troxel plurality 
                                                                                                                           
44.  Id.  
45.  Id. at 65.  
46.  Id. at 65. 
47.  Id. at 65 (quoting, Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 150, 534-535 (1925)). 
48.  Id. at 65 (quoting, Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)). 
49.  Id. at 66 (quoting, Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 589, 602 (1979)).  See also Elwell v. Byers, 699 F.3d 
1208, 1217 (10th Cir. 2012) (hold that preadoptive foster parents have federal constitutional liberty 
interests in children, though these interests are not as strong as the liberty interests of biological 
parents). 
50.  Id. at 75. 
51.  Id. at 79-80 (Souter, J., concurring); Id at 80 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
52.  Id. at 67. 
53.  Id. at 67.  The need for both a presumption and some deference has been read as required by Troxel 
in grandparent visitation cases.  See, e.g., Ex parte E.R.G., 73 So.3d 634 (Ala. 2011). 
54.  Id. at 67-68.  The constitutional presumption that parents act in the best interest of their children was 
important to the Troxel plurality because the Troxels did not allege, and no court found, that Tommie 
was an unfit parent.  Id at 68. 
55.  Id. at 69.  In New Hampshire, “special weight” means a nonparent must show, to obtain court-
ordered childcare, by “clear and convincing evidence” that such an order is the child’s best interests, 
meaning it promotes the child’s “essential physical and safety needs,” with adverse consequences to 
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rejected judicial interference with parents any time there was “mere 
disagreement” regarding a child’s best interest.56  The plurality did not 
expressly find, as did the Washington high court, that a showing of harm or 
potential harm was necessary in order to sustain nonparent visitation.57 
In concurring, Justice Souter focused only on what the plurality 
characterized as a “breathtakingly broad” statute,58 which Souter described 
as authorizing “any person” at “any time” to “petition for and to receive 
visitation rights subject only to a free-ranging best-interests-of-the-child 
standard.”59  He chose to “say no more,”60 thus not commenting upon the 
constitutionality of more narrowly drawn statutes or upon any necessary 
“special weight” or “presumption.”61   
In concurring, Justice Thomas simply noted that the “State of 
Washington lacks even a legitimate governmental interest—to say nothing 
of a compelling one—in second-guessing any fit parent’s decision regarding 
visitation with third parties.”62 
                                                                                                                           
56.  Troxel, 530 U.S. at 67-68.  See also id. at 72 (dispute involves “nothing more than a simple 
disagreement between the Washington Superior Court and Granville concerning her children’s best 
interest”).  See also Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753, (1982) (“The fundamental liberty 
interest of natural parents in the care, custody and management of their child does not evaporate 
simply because they have not been model parents or lost temporary custody of their child to the 
State.”). 
57.  Troxel, 530 U.S. at 73, 77.  Today, harm or potential harm is often, but not always, required.  See, 
e.g., Dandurand v. Pitej, 2013 IL. App. (1st) 123598-U, ¶¶ 28-30 (reviewing standard on “harm”); 
Hernandez v. Hernandez, 265 P.3d 495 (Idaho 2011) (grandparents could seek custody though no 
threshold showing of parental unfitness); South Dakota Compiled Laws 25-5-29(4) and 25-5-30 
(“serious detriment to child” can prompt nonparent custody or visitation, where assessment factors 
include “unjustifiable absence of parental custody;” “bonded relationship” between child and 
nonparent; “substantial enhancement of the child’s well-being” while under nonparent’s care; and 
“degree of stability and security in the child’s future with the parent”), construed in Feist v. Lemieux-
Feist, 793 N.W.2d 57 (S.D. 2010) (third-party custody or visitation need not be preceded by explicit 
finding of parental unfitness) and Beach v. Coisman, 2012 S.D. 31 (similar); and Bowen v. Bowen, 
2012 Ark. App. 403 (Ark. 2012) (grandparents seeking visitation must show likelihood of harm to 
child if visits are denied).   
  When harm or potential harm is required, there is sometimes disagreement on whether the 
burden of proof is preponderance, Hollis v. Miller, 2012 WL 5853824 (Mich. App. 2012), or clear 
and convincing evidence.  Id. (Gleicher, J. concurring).  At times, future substantial harm resulting 
from no grandparent visits is statutorily presumed. See, e.g., TENN. CODE 36-6-306(b)(4) 
(“rebuttable presumption of substantial harm to the child based upon the cessation of the relationship 
between the child and grandparent” when the child’s parent is deceased and the grandparent seeking 
visitation is the parent of the deceased parent).  And, at times, a requirement of future substantial 
harm may be found in state constitutional law.  See, e.g., Hawk v. Hawk, 855 S.W.3d 573 (Tenn. 
1993) and Brooks v. Parkerson, 454 S.E.2d 769, 774 (Ga. 1995).  
58.  Troxel, 530 U.S. at 67. 
59.  Id. at 76 (employing the Washington Supreme Court view). 
60.  Id. at 75. 
61.  Id. at 77 (“there is no need to decide whether harm is required or to consider the precise scope of the 
parent’s right or its necessary protections”). 








The three dissenters each filed separate opinions. Justice Stevens 
deemed that it “would have been . . . wiser to deny certiorari.”63  As to the 
statute, he found its terms were “unconstrued” by the state high court so that 
a remand was in order.64  He noted there was no “basis for holding that the 
statute is invalid in all its applications,”65 observing that it would survive a 
facial challenge if it had a “plainly legitimate sweep.”66 
In dissent, Justice Scalia, while recognizing an “unenumerated right” of 
“parents to direct the upbringing of their children”67 had been previously 
protected by substantive due process,68 nevertheless opined that any 
additional limits on this right are best determined “in legislative chambers or 
in electoral campaigns” and not in courts.69  He warned that extending further 
opportunities for “judicial vindication” of parental rights70 would require the 
Court to formulate “a judicially crafted definition of parents;”71 “judicially 
approved assessments of ‘harm to the child;’”72 and “judicially defined 
gradations of other persons” (grandparents, extended family members, 
adoptive family members in an adoption later found to be invalid, long term 
guardians, etc.) who have childcare claims against parental wishes.73  He had 
no desire for a “new regime of judicially prescribed, and federally prescribed, 
family law.”74 
In dissent, Justice Kennedy thought the case should be remanded for 
consideration of whether, and to what extent, child visits with nonparents (or 
just grandparents) might be ordered over parental objections because the 
visits served the children’s best interests, as well as whether child harm “is 
                                                                                                                           
63.  Id. at 80. 
64.  Id. at 84-85.  The Washington statute was similar to a Connecticut statute, which has been construed 
in line with Troxel.  See, e.g., DiGiovanna v. St. George, 12 A.3d 900, 907-908 (Conn. 2011) 
(recognizing that in Roth v. Weston, 789 A.2d 431 (Conn. 2002), the court “substituted the parent-
like relationship and substantial harm elements for the statutory elements of ‘any person’ and ‘best 
interest of the child,’ respectively, as a judicial gloss to remedy the constitutionally infirm 
language”). 
65.  Id. at 85. 
66.  Id. at 85 (citing, Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 739-40 and n. 7 (1997) (Stevens, J. 
concurring in judgment)). 
67.  Id. at 91 (right is among both the “unalienable rights” recognized in the Declaration of Independence 
and the other rights retained by the people per the Ninth Amendment). 
68.  Id. at 92 (but two of the three precedents originated in “an era rich in substantive due process 
holdings that have since been repudiated”). 
69.  Id. at 91-92 (while it is “entirely compatible with the commitment to representative democracy to 
argue, in legislative chambers or in electoral campaigns” about parental childrearing authority, it is 
wrong for judges, via “unenumerated” constitutional right analysis, “to deny legal effect to laws that 
. . . infringe”). 
70.  Id. at 92. 
71.  Id. at 92-93. 
72.  Id. at 93. 
73.  Id. at 93. 
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required in every instance.”75  Justice Kennedy opined that a “harm to the 
child standard” is not always required by the federal constitution when 
nonparent visits are ordered,76 given that “the conventional nuclear 
family . . . is simply not the structure or prevailing condition in many 
households.”77  He recognized there may be “a substantial number of cases” 
where a “third party, by acting in a caregiving role over a significant period 
of time, has developed a relationship with a child which is not necessarily 
subject to absolute parental veto,”78 suggesting such a third party might be 
deemed a “de facto” parent.79 
Troxel clearly guides new parent as well as nonparent child caretaking 
over the objection of biological or adoptive parents.  Since Troxel, the U.S. 
Supreme Court has not spoken.  State statutes and common law rulings vary 
on new parent and nonparent child caretaking.  Many state laws now 
recognize expanded opportunities for childcare standing because of earlier 
childcare actions, especially when a child has only one legal parent.  
III.  AMERICAN STATE LAWS LIMITING PARENTAL CHILDCARE 
RIGHTS 
A.  General Laws 
1.  Second Parent Laws 
Parentage for children with one parent80 is often extended to another 
with no actual or presumed biological ties and with no formal adoption.81 At 
times, extensions come via precedents, as in Wisconsin where there can be a 
                                                                                                                           
75.  Id. at 94. 
76.  Id. at 101-02. 
77.  Id. at 98. 
78.  Id. at 98. See also id. at 100-01 (“In short, a fit parent’s right vis-a-vis a complete stranger is one 
thing: her right vis-a-vis another parent or a de facto parent may be another.”). 
79.  Id. at 100-01. 
80.  The paper will not examine settings where state laws recognize the possibility of three or more child 
caretaking parents at any one time.  See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE 7601(b) and 7612(c) (“detriment to 
the child” standard employed in considering possible third parent). 
81.  Herein the other noted state statutes and precedents on parentage and nonparent childcare are 
assumed to meet the Troxel standards on losses or diminishments of superior parental rights, 
whatever those standards may be.  Some non-Illinois laws do seem of questionable validity.  
Consider, e.g., GA. CODE 19-7-1(b.1) (in disputes over custody between parents and, e.g., 
grandparents, aunts or siblings, “parental power may be lost” if a court, exercising “sound discretion 
and taking into consideration all the circumstances  . . . determines” such losses serve the children’s 
best interest, though there is “a rebuttable presumption” favoring parental custody). On the dangers 
posed to superior parental rights by emerging de facto parent laws (especially as applied to 









“psychological parent” or “second parent.”82  But often there are statutes, a 
preferred approach for those, like Justice Scalia, concerned about 
inappropriate judicial lawmaking.   
Some state statutes recognize new child caretaking interests in new 
parents or in nonparents that are dependent upon the biological or adoptive 
parent’s consent as well as upon earlier childrearing.83  Here, similar terms, 
like de facto parent, can have different meanings from state to state.  For 
example, in Delaware, a de facto parent can be judicially recognized for one 
who had “a parent-like relationship” with “the support and consent of the 
child’s parent;” who exercised “parental responsibility;” and who “acted in a 
parental role for a length of time sufficient to have established a bonded and 
dependent relationship with the child that is parental in nature.”84  But in the 
District of Columbia, one might seek “third-party custody” as a “de facto 
parent” if one lived with the child since birth or lived in the same household 
with the child for at least 10 of the 12 months preceding the filing of one’s 
custody request, with parental “agreement.”85   
There are also statutes on parentage presumptions.  While traditionally 
these presumptions were founded on the possibility of natural ties in the 
husband married to the birth mother, today they are not always dependent 
upon possible ties or marriage.86  Some establish a minimum time period of 
childcare.  For example, in Missouri a man “shall be presumed to be the 
natural father of a child if . . . He is obligated to support the child pursuant to 
                                                                                                                           
82.  In re Custody of H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d 419 (Wis. 1995) (consent, parent-like relationship, 
financial support, and “bonded, dependent relationship parental in nature”); In re Custody of 
B.M.H., at ¶ 29 (Wash. 2013) (adopting the H.S.H.-K. analysis, common law “de facto parent” is 
one who lived with child; established a bonded dependent relationship with child with established 
parent’s consent and aid; and assumed parental obligations without expectation of financial 
compensation; here de facto parent was the former stepfather, employed to deem a mother’s former 
same sex partner to be a de facto parent in In re Custody of A.F.J., 314 P.3d 373 (Wash. 2013) 
(former partner was also a foster parent)).  
83.  Seemingly, where the biological or adoptive parent has had parental rights terminated, the necessary 
consent will be lacking.  See, e.g., L.N.S. v. S.W.S., 842 N.W.2d 680 (Iowa Ct. App. 2013) (paternal 
grandmother’s visitation interests ended when her son’s/father’s childcare interests ended). 
84.  13 DEL. CODE 8-201(a)(4)(mother), 8-201(b)(6) (father) and 8-201(c) (the three factors to attain “de 
facto parent status”).  “De Facto” parents are on equal footing with biological or adoptive parents.  
See, e.g., Smith v. Guest, 16 A.3d 920 (Del. 2011).  But see In re Bancroft, 19 A.3d 730 (Del. Fam. 
2010) (finding statute overbroad and violative fit mother’s and father’s due process rights as relates 
to the mother’s boyfriend seeking to be a third parent). 
85.  DIST. OF COL. CODE 16-831.01 and 831.03.  
86.  See, e.g., COL. STAT. 19-4-105(d) (while child is a minor, a man is the presumed natural father if he 
“receives the child into his home” and “openly holds out the child as his natural child”); CAL. FAM. 
CODE 7611(d) (similar), read to include same sex female partners in S.Y. v. S.B., 134 Cal. Rptr. 3d 
1 (Cal. App. 3d 2011); Chatterjee v. King, 280 P.3d 283 (N.M. 2012) (Uniform Parentage Act 
presumption that man is natural father of minor he holds out openly as his own also applies to 
adoptive mother’s former same sex partner).  See also IND.  STAT. 31-14-7-2(a) (similar on receipt 
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a written voluntary promise.”87  In Minnesota, a man is “presumed to be the 
biological father of a child if . . . while the child is under the age of majority, 
he receives the child into his home and openly holds out the child as his 
biological child.”88  In Indiana, there is a comparable “rebuttable 
presumption,” but it must include “the consent of the child’s mother”89 and a 
positive genetic test.90  In Alabama, a statute requires “a significant parental 
relationship with the child” involving emotional and financial support.91  In 
Wyoming, a man “is presumed to be the father of a child if . . . for the first 
two (2) years of the child’s life, he resided in the same household with the 
child and openly held out the child as his own.”92   
Where natural ties are statutorily presumed, the lack of ties will not 
necessarily result in a rebuttal of the presumption.93  Where statutory 
presumptions explicitly address only presumed paternity, they typically are 
also applied in neutral ways so that women can also become presumed 
parents by meeting the statutory standards.94  
2.  Nonparent Childcare Laws 
American state laws also recognize that certain parental acts, not 
amounting to abuse, neglect or abandonment, can diminish superior parental 
rights by prompting nonparent childcare standing.  Often, nonparents are 
described as taking on parental duties.  These laws are often comparable to 
other American laws recognizing second parent status.  For example, a South 
                                                                                                                           
87.  MO. CODE 210.822.  This obligation seemingly can arise without “court order,” as such an order is 
another way the obligation prompting a presumption can arise.  Id.  Where two conflicting 
presumptions arise via conduct in Missouri, the controlling presumption is the one “founded on the 
weightier considerations of policy and logic.”  MO. CODE 210.822.2.  Comparably, there is a 
presumption in Kansas where a man “notoriously or in writing recognizes paternity,” which need 
not involve a voluntary paternity acknowledgement.  KAN. STAT. 38-1114(a)(4). 
88.  MINN. STAT. 257.55(d).  Where two presumptions arise via conduct in Minnesota, the controlling 
presumption is the one “founded on the weightier considerations of policy and logic.”  MINN. STAT. 
257.55(2).  Similar are the presumptions arising under MONT. CODE 40-6-105(d) and COLO. STAT. 
19-14-105(1)(d). 
89.  IND. CODE 31-14-7-2. 
90.  IND. CODE 31-14-7-2(b) (the “rebuttable presumption” does “not establish the man’s paternity;” 
paternity may only be established via 31-14-2-1, which requires positive genetic test under (3) in 
the absence of a marriage or attempted marriage). 
91.  ALAB. CODE 26-17-204(a)(5). 
92.  WY. STAT. 14-2-504(a)(v). Similar is TEX. FAM. CODE 160.204(a)(5) and 13 DEL. CODE 8-
204(a)(5). 
93.  See, e.g., Alisha C. v. Jeremy C., 808 N.W.2d 875, 884-885 (Neb. 2012) (former husband, under 
NEB. STAT. 43-1412.01, may set aside earlier divorce court finding of presumed marital paternity, 
but only if in the child’s best interests, there was no adoption, and the husband did not acknowledge 
paternity while “knowing he was not the father”). 
94.  See, e.g., Frazier v. Goudschaal, 295 P.3d 542 (Ks. 2013) (second mother is a presumed parent as 
she “notoriously” recognized a child born to her partner via assisted reproduction; co-parenting pact 
signed before birth recognizing second mother as a “de facto parent” ) and In re A.R.L., 2013 COA 








Dakota statute allows “any person other than the parent of a child to intervene 
or petition a court . . . for custody or visitation of any child with whom he or 
she has served as a primary caretaker, has closely bonded as a parental figure, 
or has otherwise formed a significant and substantial relationship.”95  In 
South Dakota, a parent’s “presumptive right to custody” is diminished when 
there is abandonment or persistent neglect; forfeiture or surrender of parental 
rights to a nonparent; abdication of “parental rights and responsibilities;” or, 
“extraordinary circumstances” where parental custody “would result in 
serious detriment to the child.”96  In Kentucky, a “de facto custodian” of a 
child can seek custody if he or she was “the primary caregiver” and “financial 
supporter,” resided with the child for at least six months, and the child is 
under three.97  In Colorado, there is nonparent standing to seek an allocation 
of parental responsibilities when the nonparent “has had the physical care of 
a child for a period of six months or more.”98  In New Mexico, when “neither 
parent is able . . . to provide appropriate care,” a child may be “raised by . . . 
kinship caregivers,” who include an adult with a significant bond to the child 
and who cares for the child “consistent with the duties and responsibilities of 
a parent.”99  And in Wisconsin, “a person who has maintained a relationship 
similar to a parent-child relationship with the child” may secure “reasonable 
visitation rights . . . if the court determines that visitation is in the best 
interests of the child.”100 
                                                                                                                           
95.  S. DAK. CODIFIED LAWS 25-5-29 (2012).  Thus, not all de facto parents can qualify as de facto 
custodians with standing to seek childcare orders.  See, e.g., Truman v. Lillard, 404 S.W.3d 86 (Ky. 
App. 2012) (former same-sex partner of woman who adopted her niece was not a de facto custodian, 
and failed to show a waiver of superior parental right to custody).  
96.  S. DAK. CODIFIED LAWS 25-5-29(1) to (4).  The statute was applied to permit visitation favoring a 
man with no biological or adoptive ties.  Clough v. Nez, 759 N.W.2d 297 (S.D. 2008).  See also S. 
DAK. CODIFIED LAWS 25-5-33 (parent can be ordered to pay child support to nonparent having 
“custodial rights”). 
97.  KY. REV. STAT. 403.270 (residence for at least one year is required if the child is older than three). 
Thus, not all de facto parents can qualify as de facto custodians with standing to seek childcare. See, 
e.g., Truman, 404 S.W.3d at 3d (former same-sex partner of woman who adopted her niece was not 
a de facto custodian and failed to show a waiver of superior parental right to custody) and Spreacker 
v. Vaughn, 397 S.W.3d 419 (Ky. App. 2012) (paternal great aunt is de facto custodian). There are 
similar laws in Indiana, K.S. v. B.W., 954 N.E.2d 1050 (Ind. App. 2011) (employing IND. CODE 31-
9-2-35.5) and Minnesota, MINN. STAT. 257c.03(2) (“de facto custodian”).  The phrase “de facto 
custodian,” and similar phrases, can also be used in other settings.  See, e.g., In re Jesse C., 2012 
WL 5902301 (Cal. App. 3d 2012) (de facto parent is one who cares for child during dependency 
proceeding; de facto parent status is lost when dependency is terminated). 
98.  COLO. REV. STAT. 14-10-123(1)(c).  See, e.g., In re B.B.O., 277 P.3d 818 (Colo. 2012) (half-sister 
has standing); In re D.T., 292 P.3d 120 (Col. App. II 2012) (mother’s friend did not gain standing 
as she “served more of a grandmotherly role, rather than a parental role” and as mother never ceded 
her parental rights). 
99.  NEW MEX. STAT. 40-10B-3(A) and (C), applied in Stanley J. v. Cliff L., 319 P.3d 662 (N.M. App. 
2013). 
100.  WIS. STAT. 767.43(1), applied in In re Marriage of Vanderheiden, 838 N.W.2d 865 (Wis. App. 2013) 
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Besides statutes, there are case precedents recognizing nonparent 
childcare standing.  For example, in Ohio there can be no “shared parenting” 
contracts between parents and nonparents.101  However, “a parent may 
voluntarily share with a nonparent the care, custody, and control of his or her 
child through a valid shared–custody agreement,” which may create for a 
nonparent “an agreement for permanent shared legal custody of the parent’s 
child” or an agreement for temporary shared legal custody, as when the 
agreement is revocable by the parent.102  In Minnesota, under certain 
conditions there is a common law right to visitation over parental objection 
for a former family member, like an aunt who stood “in loco parentis” with 
the child.103   And in New York, a grandparent has standing to seek visitation 
with a grandchild over parental objection when “conditions exist which 
equity would see fit to intervene.”104 
B.  Special Stepparent Childcare Laws 
Elsewhere, there are special childcare laws105 applicable just to 
stepparents (both present and former).106  In a Tennessee divorce, “a 
stepparent to a minor child born to the other party . . . may be granted 
reasonable visitation rights . . . upon a finding that such visitation rights 
                                                                                                                           
101.  In re Bonfield, 780 N.E.2d 241 (Ohio 2002). 
102.  In re Mullen, 953 N.E.2d 302, 306 (Ohio 2011).  Custody in the nonparent is only allowed under an 
agreement when the Juvenile Court deems the nonparent suitable and the shared custody is in the 
best interests of the child.  Bonfield, 780 N.E.2d at ¶¶ 48, 50.  See also In re LaPiana, 2010 WL 
3042394 (Ohio App. 8th 2010) (former lesbian partner secures visitation with two children born of 
assisted reproduction, where there was a written agreement to raise jointly the first child and other 
evidence of intent to share custody of both children). 
103.  Rohmiller, 811 N.W.2d at 593. (“under the common law in Minnesota, a finding of in loco parentis 
status has been essential to the granting of visitation to non-parents over the objection of a fit 
parent”).  See also In re V.D.W., 2013 WL 6231797 (Miss. App. 2013) (in post-divorce proceeding, 
mother’s ex-husband stood in loco parentis to her child, where child had been conceived before the 
marriage but born during the marriage).  At times, attaining “in loco parentis” status seemingly 
elevates nonparent to parental status.  See, e.g., Daniel v. Spivey, 386 S.W.3d 424, 429 (Ark. 2012) 
(precedents include stepparent and same sex partner of parent). 
104.  In re Van Norstrand, 925 N.Y.S.2d 229, 230 (N.Y. Sup. App. 3d 2011) (citing Domestic Relations 
Law §72[1]).  See also, In re Victoria, 56 A.3d 338 (Md. App. 2012) (sibling visitations can be 
ordered over parental objections only when standards for grandparent visits have been met). 
105.  Beside special childcare laws, for stepparents there can also be other special laws.  Consider, e.g., 
S. DAK. CODIFIED LAWS 25-7-8 (“A stepparent shall maintain his spouse’s children born prior to 
their marriage and is responsible as a parent for their support and education suitable to his 
circumstances, but such responsibility shall not absolve the natural or adoptive parents of the 
children from any obligation of support.”). 
106.  Many urge laws on present and former stepparent childcare be written by state legislators.  See, e.g., 
Cynthia Grant Bowman, The Legal Relationship Between Cohabitants and Their Partners’ 
Children, 13 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN LAW 127, 151 (2012) (“Like Professor Bartlett, I do not 
think we can simply rely on judges to make extralegal decisions to rescue children in deserving 
cases, nor do I think that it would be good for the legitimacy of our system of family law.  Instead, 
any new standards should be established by statute, to prevent, insofar as possible, inconsistent and 








would be in the best interests of the minor child and that such stepparent is 
actually providing or contributing towards the support of such child.”107  In 
California, “reasonable visitation to a stepparent” is permitted if in “the best 
interest of the minor child.”108  In Wisconsin, a stepparent (as well as a 
grandparent and others) can petition for “reasonable visitation rights” if a 
court determines that visitation is in the child’s best interests and if there is a 
preexisting “relationship similar to a parent-child relationship with the 
child.”109  In Oregon, during a dissolution proceeding a stepparent can obtain 
custody or visitation by proving “a child-parent relationship exists,” the 
presumption that the parent acts in the child’s best interest has been “rebutted 
by a preponderance of the evidence,” and the child’s “best interest” will be 
served.110  If a stepparent only proves “an ongoing personal relationship” 
with the child, the parental presumption must be rebutted by “clear and 
convincing evidence.”111  In Utah, a former “stepparent”112 can pursue child 
custody or visitation in a divorce or “other proceeding”113 through showing 
by “clear and convincing evidence” that, inter alia, the stepparent 
“intentionally assumed the role and obligations of a parent;” formed “an 
emotional bond and created a parent-child type relationship;” contributed to 
the “child’s wellbeing;” and showed the parent is “absent” or has “abused or 
neglected the child.”114  In Delaware, “upon the death or disability of the 
custodial or primary placement parent,” a stepparent who resided with the 
deceased or disabled parent can request custody even if “there is a surviving 
natural parent.”115  And in Virginia, a former stepparent with a “legitimate 
interest”116 can secure custody of or visitation with a child upon a “showing 
by clear and convincing evidence that the best interest of the child would be 
served thereby.”117 
                                                                                                                           
107.  TENN. CODE 36-6-303 (seemingly of questionable facial validity under Troxel without any showings 
as to, e.g., parental acts or child detriment). 
108.  Cal. Fam. Code 3101. 
109.  WIS. STAT. 767.43(1).  There are other special guidelines for grandparents who petition.  See, e.g., 
WIS. STAT. 767.43(3)(no earlier adoption of child and the child is a nonmarital child whose parents 
never married). 
110.  OR. REV. STAT. 109.119(3)(a).  “Child-parent relationship” means a relationship, within the past 6 
months, that “fulfilled the child’s psychological needs for a parent as well as the child’s physical 
needs.” OREGON REV. STAT. 109.119(10)(a). 
111.  OR. REV. STAT. 109.119(3)(b).  An “ongoing personal relationship” means “a relationship with 
substantial continuity for at least one year, through interaction, companionship, interplay and 
mutuality.” Oregon Rev. Stat. 109.119(10)(e). 
112.  UTAH CODE 30-5a-102(2)(e).  
113.  UTAH CODE 30-5a-103(4). 
114.  UTAH CODE 30-5a-103(2). 
115.  13 DEL. CODE 733. 
116.  VIR. CODE 20-124.1. 
117.  VIR. CODE 20-124.2.  See, e.g., Brown v. Burch, 519 S.E.2d 403, 412 (Va. App. 1999) (over 
mother’s objection, “clear and convincing evidence of special and unique circumstances” justify 
joint custody order favoring father and former stepfather, with the latter “retaining physical custody 
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IV.  CURRENT ILLINOIS STEPPARENT CHILDCARE 
OPPORTUNITIES 
Stepparent childcare standing in Illinois is guided today by both statutes 
and precedents that afford limited chances for serving the best interests of 
children without infringing upon superior parental rights.  The Illinois statute 
on former stepparent childcare orders over an existing parent’s objection 
requires the child be at least twelve years old; a marriage of at least five years; 
and, a custodial parent unable to “perform the duties of a parent to the 
child.”118   
Beyond the stepparent statute there is very limited Illinois precedent 
supporting stepparent childcare.  One case recognizes a former stepparent’s 
contractual right to childrear over parental objection via the equitable 
estoppel doctrine, at least where there is harm to the child; an earlier 
agreement by the parent to allow a former stepparent an opportunity for child 
visitation; reasonable reliance by the former stepparent on the agreement; 
and, a detrimental “change” to the former stepparent’s position as a result of 
the agreement.119  Another case recognized a widowed stepparent can seek a 
guardianship of a stepchild, the deceased spouse’s natural child, over the 
other natural parent’s objection if the stepparent demonstrates, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, that the living parent is unwilling or unable 
                                                                                                                           
  Beside special statutes, there are some common law rights regarding childcare for some former 
stepparents.  See, e.g., Bethany v. Jones, 2011 Ark. 67 (Ark. 2011) (former lesbian partner obtains 
child visitation order; court relies on Robinson v. Ford-Robinson, 208 S.W. 3d 140 (2005), where 
stepmother was able to seek visitation with stepson over father’s objection as long as visitation was 
in the child’s “best interest,” deemed the “polestar consideration”).    
  Special stepparent childcare laws, of course, may be coupled with special stepparent adoption 
laws.  See, e.g., LA. CHILDREN’S CODE ART. 1252(A) (no need for even limited home studies in 
some stepparent adoptions) and MONT. CODE 42-4-302(1)(a) (stepparent has lived with child and a 
parent with legal and physical custody for past sixty days). 
118.  750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/601 (c) (A), (B) and (C).  Other requirements for stepparent childcare in 
Illinois include, inter alia, 5 year residence of the parent and stepparent, the child’s desire to live 
with the stepparent, and the child’s best interests.  750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/601(B), (E) and (F). 
Where the stepparent was married to a parent who had custody and died, the stepparent may be able 
to obtain guardianship of the child’s person and estate, over the other parent’s objection.  755 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. 5/11-5(a) (rebuttable presumption of childcare by surviving parent), applied in In re 
A.W., 2013 IL App. (5th) 130104 (sufficient allegations on presumption’s rebuttal so that a hearing 
was required).  
119.  Engelkens, 821 N.E.2d at 806.  Equitable estoppel is more readily available when the agreement 
becomes part of a court order, as in Schlam, 648 N.E.2d at 348.  Comparably, where there was an 
earlier consent decree allowing grandparent visits, continued visits over parental objection can be 
ordered, though “changed circumstances” can end all visits.  See, e.g., In re M.M.D., 213 Ill.2d 105, 
108-09 (2004) (consolidated cases involving maternal grandparents seeking guardianship of 
deceased daughter’s child with unwed biological father wherein parties earlier agreed to consent 
order awarding permanent custody to father and recognizing for the grandparents “specific and 
detailed visitation rights, telephone access to the child, information about the child’s education and 









“to make and carryout day-to-day childcare decisions concerning the 
minor.”120 
The significant limits on Illinois stepparent childcare are illustrated by 
the Appellate Court case of In re Mancine.  There, the court recognized that 
legal parenthood of children born of sex is contextual;121 that there is as yet 
little common law on legal parenthood; that legal parentage may not track 
actual parenting; that sometimes a child’s best interests should not be 
considered in determining childcare standing; and, that there are limited 
exceptions in Illinois to superior parental interests “in the care, custody, and 
control of their children.”122 
In Mancine, a marriage dissolution proceeding,123 both the husband, 
Nicholas Gansner, and his wife, Miki Loveland Mancine, sought custody of 
a minor, William, born in August 2008.  William had been adopted by Miki 
in Wisconsin in March 2009, before her marriage to Nicholas in May 2009, 
though a preadoption wedding had been contemplated.124  By the time she 
met Nicholas, Miki already had another adopted child, Elizabeth, who 
previously lived with Miki and her ex-husband John Mancine. 125 In 
                                                                                                                           
120.  In re A.W., 2013 IL App (5th) 130104, ¶¶ 12-14 (employing 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-5 (b)). 
121.  For children born of assisted reproduction, legal parentage can also be contextual.  See, e.g., Kristine 
S. Knaplund, 45 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 899 (2012) (describing differences between Uniform Probate 
and Uniform Parentage Acts). 
122.  Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2002) (plurality opinion). 
123.  While the facts important to the court’s opinion were generally undisputed, many other facts were 
contested but never subject to evidentiary hearing(s) in the trial court.  Some of these disputed facts, 
gleaned from the Appellate Court briefs, will be reviewed herein as they are relevant to the preferred 
alternative approaches. 
124.  In re Marriage of Mancine, 2012 IL App. (1st), ¶¶ 3-4 (“Miki and Nicholas decided they would 
marry in approximately June or July of 2008 . . . William [the child involved in the custody dispute] 
was born on August 5, 2008 . . . Nicholas and Miki became formally engaged in December 2008”).  
  The Appellate Court’s factual account is derived chiefly from trial court pleadings and 
affidavits on which there was no trial, but little party disagreement. The Appellate Court briefs 
reveal, however, other facts disputed by the parties’, which evidently were unimportant to the 
Court’s resolution. For example, Miki and Nicholas disagreed on why Nicholas got a vasectomy.  
Compare Brief of Respondent-Appellant (8-12-11), at 2 (believing Miki that he “would be William’s 
father forever,” Nicholas got a vasectomy) [hereinafter Appellant Brief] with Response Brief of 
Petitioner-Appellee (10-14-11), at 13-14 (urging the vasectomy was prompted because Nicholas 
“did not want to pass on his genetic material for his mental illness (depression, et. cetera),” while 
noting the vasectomy was not mentioned in Nicholas’s trial court pleadings or his affidavit) 
[hereinafter Appellee Brief].  The parties also disagreed on whether Miki engaged in “pathological 
extramarital sexual behavior” and prostitution during her marriage to Nicholas.  Compare Appellant 
Brief, at 22 to Appellee Brief, at 11-12 (“smear campaign” which is “repugnant”). 
  The briefs also reveal additional factual assertions which seem undisputed, but outside the 
Appellate Court opinion.  See, e.g., Appellant Brief, at 5 (Nicholas and Miki had their first date in 
the Spring of 2008, a few days before Miki and John Mancine officially divorced; even then, 
Nicholas knew of soon-to-be William’s adoption, and of Elizabeth) and at 6-7 (Nicholas and Miki 
accompanied William’s birth mother to the hospital and “were with her in the delivery room”). 
125.  Mancine, 2012 IL App. (1st), ¶ 3 (when Miki and Nicholas began dating in the Spring of 2008, 
Elizabeth—Miki’s adopted daughter—was a one-year-old and Miki was separated from her then-
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Wisconsin, an unmarried couple cannot simultaneously adopt a child, but a 
single woman can adopt.126  Within a month of William’s birth, Nicholas and 
Miki “had moved in” together and “Nicholas was co-parenting William.”127 
An adoption agent advised Nicholas that he could adopt William as a 
stepparent after the marriage.128  William’s birth certificate did reflect 
Nicholas’s last name though Nicholas married Miki in Wisconsin about two 
months after William’s adoption was finalized.129  Nicholas had moved in 
with Miki at least nine months before the wedding and was co-parenting at 
their home.130  Nicholas was named by Miki in prospective adoption papers 
(though evidently not in a court proceeding) as the child’s “sole guardian” 
about three months before the wedding.131  As well, Nicholas and Miki were 
named as “parents” on William’s baptism record about seven months before 
the wedding.132   
About a month after the wedding, the adoption agency said it would 
support a stepparent adoption.133  About a year later, the agency told Nicholas 
he was free to file his petition for stepparent adoption134 at a time when yet a 
third child, Henry, was soon to be adopted.135  At that time, Nicholas 
primarily cared for all the children in the household since only Miki was 
working.136  When Nicholas began working, he continued his childcare.137  
According to Nicholas, Miki held the couple and all the children out as a 
family unit, using the last name of Gansner.138 
Miki sought a divorce about 15 months into the marriage, after the 
entire family moved to Illinois to be closer to Miki’s parents.139  Miki 
challenged Nicholas’s standing to seek custody of William as William had 
                                                                                                                           
126.  Id. at ¶ 3 (citing WIS. STAT. § 48.82 (2008)). 
127.  Id. at ¶ 4. 
128.  Id. at ¶ 3. 
129.  Id. at ¶¶ 4-5 (William, the adopted child, was born in August, 2008; his adoption by Miki was 
finalized in Wisconsin on March 4, 2009; and Miki and Nicholas were married in May, 2009). 
130.  Id. at ¶ 4 (William was born in August, 2008 and was living with Miki and Nicholas in a single 
home by early September, 2008). 
131.  Id. at ¶¶ 4-5 (adoption agent’s report of February 27, 2009 “noted that Miki named Nicholas as the 
sole guardian of William and any future child she has, and named her parents as alternate 
guardians”). 
132.  Id. (the baptism occurred in November, 2008, and the wedding occurred in May, 2009). 
133.  Id. at ¶ 5. 
134.  Id. at ¶ 5 (an August, 2010 email to Nicholas). 
135.  Id. at ¶ 6. 
136.  Id. at ¶ 7 (by then, in September, 2009, a third adopted child, Henry was in the household which had 
been moved to Chicago). 
137.  Id. at ¶ 8. 
138.  Id. at ¶ 8 (“According to Nicholas, Miki always held out William as Nicholas’ child and held herself, 
Nicholas, Elizabeth, William, and Henry as “the Gansner family”).  Two months after seeking to 
divorce Nicholas, Miki petitioned to change William’s last name to Mancine, her first husband’s 
last name.  Appellant’s Petition for Leave to Appeal, at I n.I [hereinafter Appellant Petition]. 








never been adopted by Nicholas.140  Because the family had lived in Illinois 
for more than six months, both the trial141 and appellate142 courts employed 
Illinois law143 and found a lack of standing in Nicholas.  The courts rejected 
“equitable parent,” “equitable estoppel” (barring Miki from challenging 
Nicholas’ standing), “equitable adoption,” and parens patriae arguments.144 
 The Appellate Court noted that, by statute, Nicholas, as a nonparent, 
could only seek custody if William was not in the “physical custody” of 
Miki.145  It hinted (though not strongly) that Nicholas may have had standing 
to seek visitation (as compared to custody).146  However, an uncited Illinois 
statute says “reasonable visitation privileges” may be granted to a stepparent 
                                                                                                                           
140.  Id. at ¶ 11. 
141.  Id. at ¶ 11 (trial court dismissed because “Nicholas lacked standing”). 
142.  Id. at ¶ 12 (“Nicholas’[s] arguments are not well[-]grounded”).  
143.  The Illinois courts employed Illinois, and not Wisconsin laws, seemingly because William’s “home 
state” was Illinois.  See, e.g., 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 36/102(7) (“state in which a child lived with a 
parent or a person acting as a parent for at least six consecutive months immediately before the 
commencement of the child custody proceeding”).  Had Wisconsin law been applied, the outcome 
may have differed.  See, e.g., Randy A.J. v. Norma I.J., 677 N.W.2d 630, 641-2 (Wis. 2004) (while 
precluding the use of “the equitable parent doctrine,” court allows “equitable estoppel” to “address 
those instance where unfairness in a proceeding would harm children and adults, absent the 
intervention of the court’s equitable powers”); Hendrick v. Hendrick, 765 N.W.2d 865, 868 (Wis. 
2009) (“the focus of a proceeding to determine a child’s paternity is whether the ‘best interests’ of 
the child would be served thereby”).  But see, In re Christian R.H., 794 N.W.2d 230, 233-34 n. 7 
(Wisc. Ct. App. 2010) (while there is common law authority to order child “visitation,” there is no 
nonstatutory authority to confer “parental rights”).  Had William been formally adopted by Nicholas 
under Wisconsin law, the Mancine court would likely have deferred to Wisconsin adoption law.  
See, e.g., 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/27 (full faith and credit to paternity establishments in other states 
when done “through voluntary acknowledgment, tests to determine inherited characteristics, or 
judicial or administrative processes”).  See also, Port v. Cowan, 426 Md. 435 (Md. 2012) (under 
doctrine of comity, Maryland allows same sex couple wed in a civil ceremony in California to 
divorce in Maryland though a same sex marriage was not then allowed in Maryland, where same 
sex  marriage was also not explicitly deemed by the Maryland legislature as void or unenforceable).  
On when “home state” law may not be applied (e.g., so that a Mancine court would apply Wisconsin 
common law rulings).  See Castro v. Castro, 818 N.W.2d 753 (N.D. 2012). 
144.  Neither the trial nor appellate court examined whether the trial judge had some other, independent 
authority to order “a child’s best interest” inquiry during the custody dispute between Miki and 
Nicholas.  See, e.g., In re Joshua S., 2012 Il. App. 2d 120197 (invalidating a criminal case plea 
agreement where the State promised not to seek parental rights termination; court ruled: “A trial 
court, if convinced that it is in a child’s best interest, can order the State to prosecute a petition for 
termination of parental rights against the State’s wishes without violating the separation-of-powers 
doctrine.”) 
145.  Mancine, 2012 IL App. (1st), ¶ 17 (citing 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/601(b)(2)).  See also In re T.W., 
851 N.E.2d 881 (Ill. App. 5th 2006).  Illinois is not alone in its focus on “physical custody.”  See, 
e.g., In re B.B.O., 277 P.3d 318 (Col. 2012) (parental consent to nonparent childcaring is 
unnecessary where child is not in parent’s physical custody and nonparent has cared for child for at 
least six months). 
146.  Mancine, 2012 IL App. (1st), ¶ 18 (recognizing there are “exceptions where a nonparty may be 
awarded custody or visitation;” Koelle, cited by Nicholas, was distinguished as there the deceived 
father “sought only visitation privileges”).  See also id. at ¶ 20 (distinguishing another case cited by 
Nicholas, In re Marriage of Roberts, 271 Ill. App. 3d 972 (4th Dist. 1995), because in that case there 
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only if “the child is at least 12 years old” and the stepparent has lived with 
the parent and stepparent for at least 5 years.147 The court did not address any 
common law stepparent visitation rights going beyond any statutes that might 
confer childcare standing to Nicholas.148 
As to equitable estoppel,149 the appeals court found no 
misrepresentation or concealment of a material fact, as Nicholas always 
knew that “formal adoption was necessary.”150  It suggested Nicholas slept 
on his rights.151  Nicholas’ vasectomy, prompted by Miki’s treatment of him 
as a father, did not help him in his quest for custody, as reliance on Miki’s 
                                                                                                                           
147.  750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/607(b)(1.5).  See also CAL. FAM. CODE 3101(a), (c), (d)(2)(in a marriage 
dissolution proceeding a stepparent may obtain “reasonable visitation” if “in the best interest of the 
minor child” and not in conflict with the custody or visitation rights of a birth parent not a party to 
the dissolution proceeding). 
148.  There are statutory provisions on “reasonable visitation rights” for “Grandparents, great-
grandparents and siblings of a minor child, who is one year or older,” where “there is an 
unreasonable denial of visitation by a parent” and perhaps parental objection.  750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
5/607(a), (a-3); (a-5)(1)(A-15).  See, e.g., Pruitt v. Pruitt, 2013 IL App (1st) 130032.  See also 
Dumiak v. Kinzer–Somerville, 2013 IL App (2d) 130336, ¶ 19 (reading grandparent standing to 
seek childcare as requiring child not be in parent’s physical custody, per 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
5/601(b)(2)); In re R.L.S., 844 N.E.2d at 34 (grandparents who petition for guardianship of 
grandchild need not show lack of physical custody in parent; but to prevail, they must show each 
parent is unfit). 
  There are also statutory provisions allowing guardians to seek visitation where natural parents 
desire to end the guardianships and nonparent visits.  See, e.g., In re T.P.S., 2011 IL App (5th) 
100617, 352 Ill. Dec. 590, 954 N.E.2d 673 (former same-sex female partner had standing; even with 
material change of circumstances, as with breakup of same sex couple, earlier-appointed guardian—
who had secured a natural parent’s consent—could continue visitation if it served the best interests 
of the minor, citing 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-14.1(b)).   
149.  Mancine, 2012 IL App. (1st), ¶¶ 25-29.  Parenthood by equitable estoppel differs from equitable 
parenthood because only with the former may one, here Nicholas, choose to block the attempt by 
another, here Miki, to deny one’s (here Nicholas’) parenthood.  Seemingly, with equitable parentage, 
one may not choose to avoid parenthood one had earlier embraced.  See, e.g., In re Mallett, 37 A.3d 
333, 336 (N.H. 2012) (distinguishing the two equitable concepts in discussing the limited 
opportunity for a common law marriage).  Equitable estoppel may also bar one who petitions for a 
parentage order from seeking such an order.  See, e.g., In re Felix O., 89 A.D.3d 1089 (N.Y. Sup. 
App.2d 2011) (alleged natural father barred from attacking marital paternity presumption for 
mother’s husband, as paternity case filed 5 years after birth) and In re Starla D. v. Jeremy E., 95 
A.D.3d 1065 (N.Y. Supp. App. 3d 2012) (alleged biological father may equitably estop mother’s 
pursuit of paternity order when she acquiesced in development of a close relationship between child 
and another father figure where the disruption of that relationship would be detrimental to child’s 
interests; no estoppel here as no “recognized and operative parent-child relationship” in another 
man).  See also TEX. EST. CODE 1002.004 (West 2014) (for guardianship proceedings, “child” 
includes one “adopted by a parent under a statutory procedure or by acts of estoppel”).  Similar is 
TEX. PROB. CODE 601(3) (West 2014). 
150.  Mancine, 2012 IL App. (1st), ¶ 27. 
151.  Id. at ¶ 29 (upon noting that Nicholas never petitioned to adopt William, the court quoted Bell v. 
Louisville & Nashville, R.R. Co., 106 Ill.2d 135, 146, 478 N.E.2d 384 (1985) [which cited Flannery 
v. Flannery, 320 Ill. App. 421, 432, 51 N.E.2d 349 (4th Dist. 1943), where the court said:  “Equity 








statements were irrelevant since her statements were not false or 
misleading.152  
As to equitable adoption, the court found the theory was unavailable in 
Illinois custody cases.153  Yet the court observed that the theory is available 
in intestate succession cases if there had been a “contract to adopt.”154  In 
these cases, a child would benefit financially regardless of the level of earlier 
childrearing, but there would be no childcare issues.  The Illinois Supreme 
Court has since asked the Appellate Court in Mancine to reconsider its 
finding in light of the recent Supreme Court intestate succession case, 
DeHart v. DeHart,155 which allowed intestate heirship to one whom the 
decedent had intended to adopt.156 
As to parens patriae, there was no statutory provision generally 
allowing a nonparent to seek custody even if in the child’s best interests.157 
According to the appeals court any such a provision would create tensions 
with the “superior rights doctrine.”158 
Finally, as to leaving William “fatherless,” the court observed that “no 
liberty interest exists with respect to a child’s psychological attachment to a 
non-biological parent.”159  Evidently, there was also no comparable common 
                                                                                                                           
152.  Mancine, 2012 IL App. (1st), ¶ 25.  Had Miki treated Nicholas as a father in some agreed court 
order, then Nicholas may have acquired parental standing.  In re Marriage of Schlam, 271 Ill. App. 
3d 788, 648 N.E.2d 345 (Ill. App. 1995) (mother’s earlier agreement, during divorce, to joint 
parenting estopped her from challenging former husband’s visitation interests years later, though 
ex-husband was not a presumed father as he married the mother 6 years after the birth of the child) 
and In re M.M.D., 213 Ill. 2d 105, 117, 820 N.E.2d 392, 401 (Ill. 2004) (father’s earlier agreement 
on grandparent visitation incorporated into a court order was enforceable even when based on a 
statute later declared unconstitutional; father could seek court modification of visitation order). The 
Mancine court incidentally observed that even if reliance on Miki’s misrepresentations or 
concealments were relevant, any reliance “was not reasonable.” Mancine, 2012 IL App. (1st), ¶ 29. 
153.  Id. at ¶¶ 31-34. 
154.  Id. at ¶¶ 32-34 (the courts are more sympathetic to equitable adoption in intestate succession cases, 
as here the children benefit and there is no infringement on superior parental rights).  By contrast, 
where intended parents sue for wrongful death of children not formally adopted, but for whom there 
were contracts to adopt, such intended parents are not the next of kin under the wrongful death 
statute.  Id. at ¶ 33. 
155.  DeHart v. DeHart, 2013 IL 114137 (in intestate succession setting there can be both a contract to 
adopt and an equitable adoption claim by one who was neither born to nor formally adopted by the 
decedent).  At times state statutes are explicit regarding monetary recoveries by those reared by 
nonparent decedents.  See, e.g., ARK. CODE 16-62-102(d)(3) (West 2013) (beneficiaries of wrongful 
death actions include those to whom the deceased stood in loco parentis at any time during the life 
of the deceased), applied in Zulpo v. Blann, 2013 Ark. App. 750. 
156.  Mancine v. Gansner, 372 Ill. Dec. 462, 992 N.E.2d 1 (Ill. 2013).  In addition, reconsideration was 
ordered for a second case, In re Scarlett Z.D., 2012 IL App (2d) 120226, appeal denied judgment 
vacated., 372 Ill. Dec. 464, 992 N.E.2d 3 (Ill. 2013), wherein an unwed father had sought and was 
denied childcare opportunities. 
157.  Mancine, 2012 IL App. (1st), ¶ 37. 
158.  Id. at ¶ 15 (also saying that no precedent cited allows “extraordinary” judicial power to confer 
standing on one in a custody case who “is not legally” the parent of the child). 
159.  Id. at ¶ 39 (citing In re Marriage of Simmons, 355 Ill. App. 3d, 942, 956, 825 N.E. 2d 303 (2005), 
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law attachment interest held by either William or Nicholas.160 Recognition of 
parent-like attachments, to serve children’s as well as societal and 
nonparents’ interests, could come by statute.  In the trial court, the circuit 
judge in Mancine lamented over the lack of statutory authority, saying “our 
evolving social structure has created nontraditional relationships” that 
demand “a comprehensive legislative solution.”161 
V.  NEW ILLINOIS STEPPARENT CHILDCARE OPPORTUNITIES 
 New Illinois statutes should expressly expand opportunities for second 
parenthood for certain former stepparents162 as well as for greater judicial 
discretion to recognize nonparent childcare standing for other former 
stepparents.163  Until then, childcare decisions generally will be left to 
                                                                                                                           
cases the lack of a “liberty interest” was found regarding “a child’s psychological attachment to a 
non-biological parent,” including a transsexual male who undertook an “invalid same-sex marriage” 
to a woman who later bore “an artificially inseminated child,” Simmons, 355 Ill. App. 3d at 945, 
955-956, and an adoptive parent who child reared under a private adoption that was later deemed 
invalid, Kirchner, 164 Ill.2d at 472-474).  But see, Lofton v. Secretary of DCFS, 358 F.3d 804, 814 
(11th Cir. 2004) (a liberty interest could arise where state law “created a ‘justifiable expectation’ of 
family unit permanency,” as with a foster parent, or a legal guardian, or perhaps a common law 
parent). 
160.  See Simmons v. Simmons, 486 N.W.2d 788 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992) (former stepparent, with no 
statutory right to visitation because he had not lived with the child for two years, could urge a 
common law right to visitation if in loco parentis to the child). 
161.  Transcript of Proceedings Before Judge Nancy Katz in Mancine v. Gansner, Case No. 10D9394 
(March 14, 2011), at p. 14.  Judge Katz also observed that it was an “unfortunate situation” that 
Nicholas lacked standing to seek custody under the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage 
Act. Id. at 14-15.  Further, she “would love nothing better than to determine what is in William’s 
best interests” regarding Nicholas’ parenting in this “heart breaking case.”  Id. at 5. 
162.  See, e.g., Stephen N. Peskind, Who’s Your Daddy? An Analysis of Illinois’ Law of Parentage and 
the Meaning of Parenthood, 35 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 811 (2004) (parentage opportunities for non-
biological and non-adoptive parents in Illinois should be grounded in new statutory provisions 
generally prioritizing children’s best interests).  Peskind’s argument not fully embraced herein, in 
part, because of its difficulties under Lehr v. Robertson, as described in Jeffrey A. Parness & Zachary 
Townsend, Legal Paternity (and Other Parenthood) After Lehr and Michael H, 43 U. TOL. L. REV. 
225 (2012) (federal constitutional paternity opportunity interests in unwed fathers who sire children 
via sex with unwed mothers) [hereinafter “Parness and Townsend”] and because of the current need 
under the Illinois superior rights doctrine that consents to childrear (express or implicit) by both 
natural or adoptive parents usually be judicially recognized.  See, e.g., In re Marriage of Engelkens, 
821 N.E.2d 799 (Ill. App. 3d 2004) (child’s best interests cannot override a biological father’s 
decision to discontinue reasonable visitation privileges for former stepmother notwithstanding his 
earlier agreement to allow such visits where the former stepmother did not detrimentally alter her 
position in reliance on the agreement); In re Coulter, 2012 IL 113474 (joint parenting agreements 
on relocation differ when they are and are not incorporated into court orders). 
163.  For an argument that Illinois common law should recognize childcare interests in non-biological and 
non-adoptive child caretakers whose same sex couple relationships are dissolving, see Desiree 
Sierens, Protecting the Parent-Child Relationship: The Need for Illinois Courts to Extend Standing 








“natural or adoptive parents”164 regardless of their earlier accessions to 
stepparent childcare and regardless of the best interests of their children.165 
Floodgates will not open if Illinois lawmakers proceed cautiously.166  
A.  Pending Proposals 
Recognizing the need for childcare reforms, the Illinois General 
Assembly created a study committee, resulting in recent proposed Illinois 
Parentage Acts [hereinafter the original 2013 proposal is Proposed Parentage 
Act167] and proposed Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Acts 
[hereinafter the original 2013 proposal is Proposed MDM Act168].  The 
                                                                                                                           
164.  750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/2 (Illinois Parentage Act of 1984).  While certainty seemingly is promoted, 
it comes at the expense of children’s and adults lived experiences and legitimate expectations, 
creating a new class of illegitimate children.  Carlos A. Ball, Rendering Children Illegitimate in 
Former Partner Parenting Cases: Hiding Behind the Façade of Certainty, 20 AM. U. J. GENDER, 
SOC. POL’Y & L. 623, 662-67 (2012). 
165.  See, e.g., T.M.H. v. D.M.T., 79 So.2d 787 (Fla. App. 5th 2011), a case involving possible future 
childrearing by a woman who provided her ova to her lesbian partner so both women could childrear; 
a concurring opinion declared: 
I write . . . to highlight the unfortunate absence of an important consideration that should 
inform our decision in cases such as this.  Yes, I know, as did the able trial judge, that 
the best interests of the child is ordinarily not the test to be applied . . . I think we need 
to find a way to redirect our focus in cases of this kind so that best interests becomes 
part of the decisional matrix.  Surely we have to make room for that factor in the 
crucible.  Exploring the parental rights of one litigant or the other should not be the end 
of our deliberations.  In the final analysis, we still ought to come to grips with what is 
best for the child.  Here, having two parents is better than one.  Id. at at 804-05. 
166.  Miki argued in Mancine that any recognition of Nicholas’ childcare interests in William “would 
open the floodgates” to any ex-boyfriend or to “virtually anyone” who cared for William.  Appellee’s 
Answer to Petition for Leave to Appeal, at 4 [hereinafter Appellee Answer].  Similar concerns have 
been judicially expressed where adequate limits have nevertheless been found.  See, e.g., Chatterjee 
v. King, 280 P.3d 283 (N.M. 2012) (Bosson, J., specially concurring) (“I agree with the outcome 
reached by the majority, but on narrower grounds.  I write out of concern that this Opinion might be 
interpreted to expand the population of presumed parents in a manner that would shake settled 
expectations of custody rights and child support responsibilities.”).  But, as the aforenoted non-
Illinois American state statutes illustrate, floodgates can be controlled. Open adoption contracts 
could also subject to floodgate concerns.  But as Professor Brian Bix observes:  “Gradually, courts 
and legislatures have moved toward making these arrangements enforceable.  As of May 2011, 26 
states and the District of Columbia have statutes authorizing the enforcement of such agreements.”  
“Agreements in Family Law,” posted at SSRN, abstract id 2125343, at p. 15 (March 1, 2012) (such 
agreements are usually “conditional on judicial approval and subject to judicial modification”).  
167.  The Illinois Family Law Study Committee’s work led to HB 6191, 97th Illinois General Assembly 
(introduced 5-31-12), which includes a Proposed Illinois Parentage Act of 2012.  H.B. 6191, 97th 
Gen Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2012).  The 2013 Proposed Illinois Parentage Act (as originally 
introduced on 2-1-13) appears in HB 1243, 98th General Assembly. H.B. 1243, 97th Gen Assemb., 
Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2013). 
168.  The Illinois Family Law Study Committee’s work led to HB 6192, 97th Illinois General Assembly 
(introduced 5-31-12), which included proposed changes to a variety of Illinois statutes governing 
family matters, including the Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act, the Alienation of Affections 
Act, and the Domestic Violence Act. H.B. 6192, 97th Gen Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2012).  The 
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proposals must be read together as they cover different childcare interests.  
For example, the marital presumptions establishing parentage are found in 
the Proposed Parentage Act,169 while the Proposed MDM recognizes legal 
parentage for certain unwed parents.170  The proposals, at times, however, do 
speak to similar settings.171  Unfortunately, the proposals insufficiently 
address many of the stepparent childcare issues raised by Mancine as they do 
not speak directly to equitable adoption172 or to the current stepparent 
childcare statute.  Generally, the Proposed Parentage Act would not allow a 
former stepparent to be a presumed parent173 and the Proposed MDM Act 
would not allow a former stepparent174 to be eligible for “an allocation of 
parenting time” if the relationship between the parent and stepparent 
ended.175   
                                                                                                                           
ILL. B.J. 458, 458-59 (2012).  The 2013 Proposed Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act 
(as originally introduced on 1-9-13) appears in SB 0010, 98th General Assembly. S.B. 10, 98th Gen. 
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (2013). 
169.  See, e.g., Proposed Parentage Act, at §204(a)(1) (man presumed a parent of a child if “he and the 
mother . . . are married to each other or are in a state-recognized civil union and the child is 
born . . . during the marriage or civil union, except as provided by the Gestational Surrogacy Act or 
Article 7 of this Act” (Child of Assisted Reproduction)). 
170.  See, e.g., Proposed MDM, at 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/600 (“Equitable parent” includes “a person 
who, though not a legal parent of a child . . . lived with the child for at least 2 years” while believing 
to be “the child’s biological parent”). 
171.  Compare, e.g., Proposed Parentage Act, at § 204(a)(5) (“man is presumed to be a parent of a child 
if . . . for the first two years of the child’s life, he resided in a household with the child and openly 
held out the child as his own during that time”) with Proposed MDM, at 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/600 
(“Equitable parent” includes “a person who, though not a legal parent of the child . . . lived with the 
child since the child’s birth or for at least 2 years, and held himself out as the child’s parent while 
accepting parental responsibilities, under an agreement with the child’s legal parent (or, if there are 
2 legal parents, both parents) to rear the child together, each with allocated parental rights and 
responsibilities, provided that a court finds that recognition of the person as a parent is in the child’s 
best interests”). 
172.  The Proposed MDM Act does speak to equitable parenthood, but it would not include Nicholas as 
he had not lived with Miki and William for two years before his divorce. S.B. 10, 98th Gen. Assemb., 
Reg. Sess. (2013). 
173.  S.B. 10, 98th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (2013). 
174.  See id. Nicholas and Miki began cohabitating in September 2008 and Miki sought marriage 
dissolution in August 2010.  As well, Elizabeth already had two legal parents—Miki and John 
Mancine.  Compare MONT. CODE 40-4-221 and 40-4-211(6) (upon death of “a parent,” a nonparent 
who had established with the child a child-parent relationship can seek “a parenting plan hearing”) 
and COLO. STAT. 14-10-123(1)(c) (nonparent can seek “allocation of parental responsibilities” if 
nonparent “has had the physical care of a child” for more than 182 days, as long as action is 
commenced within 182 days “after termination of such physical care”).   
175.  Proposed MDM Act, at 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/601.2(b)(3), with parenting time defined in 750 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. 5/600.  Allocations of parental time, however, involve less significant childcare 
opportunities than allocations of parental responsibilities.  See Proposed MDM Act, at 750 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. 600 (parental responsibilities include both “parenting time” and “significant decision-
making responsibilities with respect to a child”). 
  As compared to parenting “responsibilities” or “time,” in Ohio noncustodial family members, 
including grandparents and other relatives, may seek “reasonable companionship or visitation 
rights” when a related custodial parent dies, OHIO REV. CODE 31-9.11, as long as Troxel limits are 








Currently, the parents of children born of sex176 having superior rights 
generally include biological and adoptive parents.177  Biological parents in 
Illinois now include men whose natural ties are statutorily presumed, though 
lacking in reality.  Men whose wives bear children born of sex are presumed 
natural parents.178  Seemingly, there is no presumption (at least statutory) for 
a man married to a mother during her pregnancy, but unmarried either at the 
time of conception or birth.179  Where natural ties in the husband are known 
to be lacking at birth, or are shown to be lacking thereafter, this presumption 
can nevertheless continue, at times even when the real natural father,180 the 
                                                                                                                           
not met) and In re K.P.R., 197 Ohio App.3d 193, 966 N.E.2d 952 (Ohio App. 12th 2011) (Troxel 
limits may have been met, where “relative” of deceased mother was a stepfather who was awarded 
visitation, in a setting where the custodial biological father objected but had earlier waived 
nonjurisdictional arguments regarding the visits). 
176.  See, e.g., 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/2 (under Illinois Parentage Act of 1984, “parent and child 
relationship” includes child and “natural or adoptive parents”).  The same general approach has been 
employed elsewhere, albeit with dissent.  See, e.g., Debra H. v. Janice R., 930 N.E.2d 184 (N.Y. 
2010) (differing views on the approach, earlier approved in Matter of Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572 
N.E.2d 27 (N.Y. 1991)). Biological and adoptive children have not always been comparably treated.  
See, e.g., Anderson v. BNY Mellon, 463 Mass. 299 (2012) (before 1958, adopted children were 
generally excluded from many instruments addressing inheritance). 
177.  Parentage for children not born of sex presents different questions.  Consider, e.g., 750 ILL. COMP. 
STAT. 47/1 et seq. (Gestational Surrogacy Act) (children born to surrogates may be parented by 
gametes contributors, 47/20(b)(1)) and 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 40/3 (semen donor is treated as natural 
father of a child conceived via artificial insemination and born to his wife).  Childcare issues for 
stepparents typically involve children born of sex so the main focus herein will be on these children. 
178.  See, e.g., 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/5(a)(1) (“A man is presumed to be the natural father of a child if 
. . . he and the child’s natural mother are or have been married to each other . . . and the child is born 
or conceived during such marriage”).   
179.  Compare MO. STAT. 210.8221.(1)(“born during marriage”); CAL. FAM. CODE 7540 (“child of a wife 
cohabiting with her husband”). 
180.  An alleged real natural father can bring an “action to determine the existence of the father and child 
relationship, whether or not such a relationship is presumed.”  750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/7(a).  Under 
statute, such an action by the alleged “natural parent” shall only “be barred if brought later than 2 
years after the child reaches the age of majority.”  750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/8(a)(1).  Yet the Illinois 
Supreme Court has suggested that an alleged natural father who comes in “ten years later,” saying 
“I want a cotton swab, I’m the dad,” would likely lose.  In re Parentage of John M., 817 N.E.2d 500, 
510 (Ill. 2004).  In so suggesting, it urged law reformers seeking greater clarification go to the 
General Assembly.  Id. at 511.  See also In re Marriage of Slayton, 685 N.E.2d 1038 (Ill. App. 4th 
1997) (real natural father waived objection to ex-husband’s request for visitation under suspect 
federal constitutional standard) [hereinafter In re Slayton].  Slowinski v. Sweeney, 64 So.3d 128 
(Fla. App. 1st 2011) (alleged biological father has no statutory standing to bring paternity suit where 
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wife,181 or the husband182 objects.183  There are, for example, statutory 
standing requirements and time limits for objections.184  The marital 
                                                                                                                           
181. The wife, “the natural mother” under 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/7(b) can seek solely to rebut a marital 
paternity presumption, under 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/(a)(1) and (2), but only within “2 years after 
the petitioner obtains knowledge of relevant facts,” 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/8(a)(3).  See also In re 
Slayton, 292 Ill. App. 3d at 385 (waiver of chance to rebut as objection raised only at end of custody 
hearing).  Rebuttal perhaps may be sought indirectly, however, in an action by the mother which 
seeks to determine, on behalf of her child, an alleged natural father’s paternity, which itself can be 
brought up to 2 years after the child reaches the age of majority, 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/8(a)(1).  
Compare Louisiana Civil Code 185-193 (while husband residing with wife may “disavow paternity” 
within a year of when he “learns or should have learned of the birth,” wife may disavow only when 
she seeks to establish her new husband is the father); Clark v. Evans, 254 P.3d 672 (Okla. 2011) 
(former wife estopped from rebutting marital presumption seven years after divorce); and In re 
Custody of D.T.R., 796 N.W.2d 509 (Minn. 2011) (wife can appeal loss by biological father of 
paternity action to husband with a marital presumption, even where the biological father does not 
appeal, as she is “an aggrieved party”). 
182.  A husband, a presumed natural father under 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/5(a)(1), can seek solely to 
rebut the presumption, under 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/7(b), but only within “2 years after petitioner 
obtains knowledge of relevant facts,” 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/8(a)(3).  See also In re Marriage of 
Roberts, 271 Ill. App.3d 972, 981 (husband, who was not biological father, can seek custody when 
he petitions for marriage dissolution as long as marital presumption had not been rebutted earlier).  
Compare UTAH CODE 7-45g-607(1) (man presumed to be father under marital presumption, Utah 
Code 78-45g-204(1)(a), may challenge “at any time prior to filing an action for divorce”); Louisiana 
Code Art. 189 (action by husband for disavowal of marital paternity presumption, under Art. 184, 
usually “is subject to a liberative prescription of one year”); and MINN. STAT. 257.57(b) (to declare 
“nonexistence” of marital paternity presumption, husband may not sue “later than three years after 
the child’s birth).  
  In Illinois, while a husband has two years to seek rebuttal of the marital presumption, his wife 
has twenty years to sue the natural father in a paternity action even when the husband objects because 
he may lose his parental status in the paternity action.  In re G.M., 2012 IL App (2d) 110370. 
183.  It seems unclear whether the marital presumption of parentage continues when only a nonparent, 
like a grandparent, objects.  See, e.g., In re A.K., 620 N.E.2d 572 (Ill. App. 4th 1993) (great-
grandmother objects to childcare interests asserted by presumed, but not natural, father in child abuse 
proceeding; two justices recognize voice from presumed father as consistent “with any ability he 
might have to adopt.”  Id. at 989.  While a third justice dissents, finding the state is required to prove 
the presumed father unfit in order to obtain an order designating the child as a ward.  Id. at 990). See 
also Ex Parte S.P., 72 So.3d 1250 (Ala. Civ. App. 2011) (maternal grandmother lacked standing to 
disestablish paternity in deceased daughter’s husband). 
184.  In Illinois, the statutory requirements vary by who petitions to rebut the presumption.  See, e.g., 750 
ILL. COMP. STAT. 7(b) and (b-5) (action to declare nonexistence of parent and child relationship may 
be brought “by the child, the natural mother, or a man presumed to be the father”; such an action 
may also be brought “subsequent to an adjudication of paternity in any judgment  by the man 
adjudicated to be the father” pursuant to certain statutory presumptions if DNA tests show he is not 
the natural father).  Compare, COLO. STAT. 19-4-107(b) (for “declaring the nonexistence of the 
father and child relationship presumed” due to marriage or attempted marriage, an action must be 
“brought within a reasonable time after obtaining relevant facts but in no event later than five years 
after the child’s birth;” for a similar declaration involving a presumption due to receipt into home 
and openly holding out the child as one’s own, due to a paternity acknowledgement or due to genetic 
tests, there are no comparable time limits); COLO. STAT. 19-4-105(c) (special factors, involving 
“fraud, duress or mistake of material fact,” are necessary in challenging certain paternity 
acknowledgements); TENN. STAT. 36-2-30(b)(2)(A) (if mother and husband were married and living 
together at the time of conception and “have remained together . . . through the date a petition to 
establish parentage is filed,” and if mother and husband swear the “husband is the father,” “any 








presumption operates in Illinois, though not elsewhere, even where the 
husbands are sterile, or living and sleeping apart from their wives.185  
Presumed parentage for a husband can continue elsewhere even when the 
biological father timely seeks to childcare.186 
The Proposed Parentage Act in Illinois not only generally maintains the 
current marital paternity presumptions,187 but also extends presumptions to 
settings outside of marriage.  The proposal, for example, recognizes 
“parentage” in a man who is presumed to have natural ties if “for the first 2 
years of the child’s life,” the man resided “in a household with the child and 
openly held out the child as his own during that time.”188  But this 
presumption would not cover Nicholas Gansner as he “had moved in” with 
Miki only within a month of William’s birth.189  This proposal, with its two 
year residency requirement, contains a more limited presumption than has 
                                                                                                                           
child;” husband and wife are “estopped to deny paternity in any future action” if they so swear); and 
WASH. CODE 26.26.530 (with certain exceptions, actions to rebut marital paternity presumptions, 
26.26.116, must be “commenced not later than two years after the birth of the child” by “a presumed 
father, the mother, or another individual”). 
  Elsewhere, there are also common law doctrines limiting attempts to disestablish statutory 
presumptions of parentage.  See, e.g., K.E.M. v. P.C.S., 23 A.2d at 1050 (paternity by estoppel can 
bar a mother’s husband from denying paternity of a marital child where the child’s best interests are 
served, perhaps even if there has been no deceit, in an action by the mother against the biological 
father for child support). 
185.  Compare, e.g., 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/2 (paternity presumption where man is or was married to 
natural mother when a child born of sex was conceived or delivered) with CAL. FAM. CODE 7540 
(“the child of a wife cohabiting with her husband, who is not impotent or sterile, is conclusively 
presumed to be a child of the marriage”). 
186.  See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 120 (conclusive marital paternity presumption 
promotes “family integrity and privacy”).  However, it remains unclear whether the U.S. Supreme 
Court will rule that all biological fathers have no “federal constitutional parental prerogatives” when 
their children are born into intact marriages.  Parness & Townsend, supra note 162, at 237-38. 
187.  The proposal does limit, significantly, the current presumption by covering children born “during” 
marriage, but not children “conceived” during marriage.  Compare Proposed Parentage Act, at 
§204(a)(1) (man is presumed  a parent if a child born to the mother “during” a marriage or civil 
union) to 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/5(a)(1) (man is presumed a “natural father” if married to the 
natural mother when “child is conceived or born”). 
188.  Proposed Parentage Act, at 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 204(a)(5).  Holding out to be something one is 
not, and acquiring the status one falsely claims, is not unique to parentage.  See, e.g., Small v. 
McMaster, 352 S.W.3d 280, 282 (Tex. App.-Houston 14th 2011) (Texas statute recognizing 
“informal” marriage requires a couple to present “to others that they were married”).   
  There is no “first 2 years” rule in Minnesota or Alabama.  See MINN. STAT. 257C.08(4) (minor 
who resided with a person for 2 years may be subject to a reasonable visitation order, if the person 
established “emotional ties creating a parent and child relationship,” if visitation served the child’s 
best interests, and if such visitation “would not interfere with the relationship between the custodial 
parent and the child”.); ALA. CODE 26-17-204(a)(6) (man receives child into his home, openly holds 
out child as his natural child, and “establishes a significant parental relationship”). 
189.  In re Marriage of Mancine, 2012 IL App. (1st) 111138, ¶ 4.  There was no indication in the Appellate 
or Supreme Court briefs of allegations that William resided in any way with Nicholas before 
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been undertaken elsewhere, as specific habitation periods are sometimes 
unnecessary or more limited.190  
There are also no current or proposed statutory presumptions in Illinois 
establishing parentage for men, with or without natural ties, whose girlfriends 
bear children, even where cohabitation began before birth and continued 
thereafter; there was an agreement on dual parentage; and the couple lived in 
a unitary family unit.191  Further, as there is no common law marriage in 
Illinois, there is not much chance for presumed common law parentage.192 
                                                                                                                           
190.  See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE 7611 (d) (receipt of child in home and openly holding out child as her/his 
natural child), applied in L.M. v. M.G., 145 Cal. App. 4th 133 (Cal. Ct. App. 4th 2012) (former 
lesbian partner is presumed parent of child adopted by her ex-partner during their cohabitation—
though there was no registered domestic partnership); In re Bryan D., 199 Cal. App. 4th 127 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 2d 2011) (recognizing grandmother may be presumed parent under Section 7611(d)); N.M. 
Stat. 40-11-5 (A)(4) (paternity presumption of “natural” fatherhood for a man who “openly holds 
out the child as his natural child and has established a personal, financial or custodial relationship 
with the child”), applied to a woman in Chatterjee , at 287-88; ALA. CODE 26-17-204 (a)(5) 
(paternity presumption outside of marriage when man receives child into his home, openly holds 
child out as his own, and establishes a significant parental relationship),  applied in Ex parte T.J., 89 
So.3d 744 (Ala. 2012) (non-biological father of a child could be presumed father under this section); 
and MONT. CODE 40-4-211(4)(b) and (6) (“parenting plan” can be pursued by a nonparent with a 
“child-parent relationship”).   
  Extending such parentage to a woman is more problematic for children born of sex, as the 
natural mother acquires parental rights simply by giving birth.  See, e.g., In re D.S., 207 Cal.  App. 
4th 1088 (Cal. Ct. App. 4th 2012) (stepmother who received a child to her home, Cal. Family Code 
7611(d), nevertheless is not a presumed mother where natural mother objects though child had been 
living with natural father; stepmother must seek to adopt to attain parenthood status where natural 
mother “abandoned her parental rights and responsibilities”).  
  See also KY. STAT. 403.270 (1)(a) and (b) (“de facto custodian” is a primary caregiver and 
financial supporter of a child who resided with the child for more than 6 months if the child is under 
3; such custodian has “the same standing in custody matters that is given to each parent”).  
Incidentally, in Kentucky, even when nonparents have not established de facto custodian status, they 
can pursue custody notwithstanding the superior right of parents by presenting “clear and 
convincing” evidence of parental unfitness or waiver of superior rights.  Mullins v. Picklesimer, 317 
S.W. 3d 569, 578 (Ky. 2010).  De facto custodians were found in, e.g., Ramsey v. Ramsey, 2012 
WL 3047210 (Ky. Ct. App. 2012) (maternal grandparents deemed de facto custodians over their 
daughter’s [the natural mother’s] objection) and Ball v. Tatum, 373 S.W.3d 458 (Ky. App. 2012) 
(maternal grandparents deemed primary residential custodians over mother’s objection). 
191.  Seemingly, such statutory presumptions are available to state legislators wishing to protect “unitary” 
families under the reasoning of federal constitutional cases like Michael H., 491 U.S. at 123.  This 
availability, while not yet generally seized by states, is discussed in Parness & Townsend, supra 
note 162, at 233-42.  Another area of possible presumptions involves children born to unwed 
mothers as a result of artificial insemination consented to by their intimate partners.  In Illinois, such 
consents do not prompt parental rights.  750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 40/2 and 3 (consents available only 
to husbands).  Yet another possible presumption involves a surrogacy contract between a woman 
who will bear a child and an unwed couple who will secure custody and raise the child upon birth.  
In Illinois, such surrogacy contracts can be valid if the statutory requirements on consent and the 
like are met.  750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 47/1 et seq. (Gestational Surrogacy Act, especially Sections 10 
and 20(b)).  Outside of Illinois, such surrogacy pacts can be “void and unenforceable as contrary to 
public policy.”  See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS 722.855. 
192.  See, e.g., Ayala v. Fox, 564 N.E.2d 920 (Ill. App. 2d 1990).  Compare, IOWA CODE 252A.3 (“A 
child or children born of parents who held or hold themselves out as husband and wife by virtue of 








As for adoption, under Mancine the superior parental rights involving 
children born of sex seemingly arise only when there are formal adoptions.193  
Intent or agreement to adopt, or parental allowance of childcare by others, if 
not undertaken under the statutory adoption scheme, are mainly irrelevant in 
later childcare disputes between parents and (soon-to-be) former stepparents. 
While the Mancine court rejected any use by Nicholas of an “equitable 
adoption” doctrine,194 the court did recognize the theory of “contract to 
adopt” is available in other settings where there has been no formal 
adoption.195  In the appellate decision in Mancine, two high court cases were 
distinguished.  In each, the property of intended adopters, who died intestate 
and who had contracted with the birth parents to adopt, was available to the 
intended adoptees as child heirs.196 As well, while the Mancine court said no 
“contract to adopt” could establish the intended adopters as parents with 
standing to sue for the wrongful deaths of the intended adoptees,197 it did not 
say that intended adoptees who could prove a “contract to adopt” could not 
pursue wrongful death claims involving intended adopters.198  So, informal 
                                                                                                                           
S.W.3d at 282 (applying TEX. FAM. CODE 2.401(a), which court describes as recognizing an 
“informal or common-law marriage”); and Clark Sand Co., Inc. v. Kelly, 60 So.3d 149, 157 (Ala. 
2011) (elements of a common law marriage do not necessarily include “ceremony or particular 
words,” citing Boxwell v. Boswell, 497 So.2d 479, 480 (Ala. 1986)).  Even where there was common 
law marriage, there need not be common law parentage (i.e., no parentage without biological ties or 
formal adoption per statute).   
  There is also no statute in Illinois recognizing a marriage which is not solemnized as legal and 
valid.  See also UTAH CODE 30-1-4.5 (man and woman have a contract and hold themselves out as 
husband and wife). 
193.  Superior parental rights for children not born of sex may arise without marital presumptions or 
adoptions.  See, e.g., 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 47/25 (in certain settings, gestational surrogacy contracts 
are enforceable). 
194.  In re Marriage of Mancine, 2012 IL App. (1st) 111138, ¶¶ 31-34. 
195.  The Mancine court also concluded the contract to adopt theory was unavailable to Nicholas “because 
here there was no contract to adopt.”  Id. at ¶ 32.  This conclusion was not explained and is 
contradicted by Nicholas’ allegations as to his arrangements with Miki about his adoption of William 
after the marriage.  Id.  
196.  Id. at ¶ 32 (Monahan v. Monahan, 14 Ill.2d 449, 453 (1958) (oral contract must be proven by “clear 
and convincing” evidence; though intended adopters were advised their intended son could be 
provided for by will [as no formal adoption was possible given the son’s age—incidentally, bad 
legal advice], the absence of any will did not estop the intended son)); and id. at ¶ 32 (Dixon Nat. 
Bank of Dixon v. Neal, 5 Ill.2d 328, 335 (1955) (agreement to adopt established “clearly and 
positively”)). 
197.  Id. at ¶ 33 (In re Estate of Edwards, 106 Ill.App.3d 635 (2nd Dist. 1982) (intended adopters were 
not “next of kin” under statute)). 
198.  Id. at ¶¶ 33-34 (citing Edwards, 106 Ill.App.3d 635).  While the Edward’s court said “the wrongful 
death statute . . . is to be strictly construed,” it recognized both that the ‘contract to adopt’ theory 
could be applied in the intestate cases where intended adoptees sought to recover and that an 
intended adoptee, or at least his/her biological parent who orally contracts for adoption, can sue to 
obtain “enforcement of contract rights.”  Edwards, 106 Ill. App.3d at 638.  See also In re Marriage 
of Mancine, 2012 IL App. (1st) 111138, ¶ 33 (“oral contract to adopt merely permits the enforcement 
of contract rights,” presumably by the intended adoptees, and “does not create a parent-child 
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adoption contracts can lead to parentage only for those people who die where 
any intended children benefit financially.199  For now, contracts to adopt 
cannot, in the absence of formal adoption, lead to childcare opportunities for 
willing, able and living intended parents, meaning that any intended adopted 
children do not have the chance to benefit via childcare.  Here the superior 
rights of biological or adoptive parents are secured, though these parents may 
have invited nonparents to childrear and though the intended parents, the 
children, and others (like intended siblings), are often significantly harmed 
by the terminations of “established familial or family-like bonds.”200  This 
may change after the Mancine remand hearings are concluded.  But even a 
sympathetic expansion of the contract to adopt theory from the intestate 
succession decision in DeHart will not help many stepparents.  The 
suggested contract guidelines in DeHart are quite rigorous so that their use 
in childcare cases would exclude many loving stepparents who had little or 
no reason to speak of adoption, as when a stepparent’s spouse with a child in 
the household dies suddenly when there was no earlier reason to discuss 
possible adoption (because, e.g., possible later child support from a 
heretofore absent second parent may not wish to be extinguished). 
Interestingly, by contrast, the superior parental rights of birth mothers 
via assisted reproduction are already waivable via nonadoption contracts in 
Illinois.  Nonadoption prebirth contracts with willing, nongenetic, intended 
married parents in assisted reproduction settings prompt parental waivers by 
birthmothers, characterized as surrogates.201  
B.  Preferable Approaches 
1.  New Unconditional Stepparent Childcare Interests 
How might stepparent childcare standing be expanded in Illinois?   
There could be statutory adaptions of other American state laws on de facto, 
presumed, or comparable parentage expanding childcare standing for former 
stepparents (and other nonparents alike).  There could be extensions of 
                                                                                                                           
199.  On the need to recognize greater financial benefits for the children of unmarried parents and of 
stepparents, even without contracts to adopt, see Cynthia Grant Bowman, The New Illegitimacy: 
Children of Cohabiting Couples and Stepchildren, 20 LOY. J. GENDER, SOC. POL’Y & L. 437 (2012) 
(discussing inheritance, government benefits, and standing to bring a number of tort claims). 
200.  Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 88 (2000) (Stevens, J.) (also suggesting children may have 
“fundamental liberty interests” in “preserving” such bonds). 
201.  750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/2.5.  See also 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 40/3(a) (only a husband who consents 
will be “treated in law if he were the natural father of a child” conceived when his wife was 
“inseminated artificially with semen donated by a man not her husband”).  Such non-genetic 
consenting parents may also need to include lesbians whose partners [in and outside of state-
recognized relationships like marriage and civil unions] deliver children from assisted reproduction 
where the lesbians consented.  See, e.g., Shineovich v. Shineovich, 214 P.3d 29, 39-40 (Or. Ct. App. 








precedents on contract to adopt, as the Supreme Court has suggested in 
remanding Mancine, so that former stepparents (and other nonparents) can 
become parents with superior rights.  There could also be an expansion of the 
current Illinois stepparent childcare statute that would extend the 
opportunities for continuing stepparent/stepchild relationships post-
dissolution, or after the single parent’s death, in order to serve the best 
interests of the children.202 
As well, there could be new recognitions of stepparents as parents via 
private formal family relations contracts, including pacts expressly or 
implicitly allowed by statutes on premarriage, midmarriage and marriage 
separation pacts.  Thus, via premarital agreements, single parents (i.e., where 
a child has one parent) might be permitted to agree, subject to some judicial 
oversight, that their future spouses, and thus their children’s future 
stepparents, become eligible to be second parents after some time and under 
certain conditions, assuring childcare interests for responsible stepparents 
and continuing loving childcare and child support for the children.203   
Further, in the absence of express or implicit statutory recognition, there 
could be expanded parentage or childcare standing for stepparents and quasi 
stepparents via common law recognitions of unwritten family relations 
contracts, including pacts between those who are not formally wed, 
domestically partnered, or unionized.204  Expanding upon high court 
                                                                                                                           
202.  Grandparent childcare opportunities are also significantly limited in Illinois, though they need not 
be if Troxel is read not to require a showing of harm.  750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/607(a-5)(3) 
(grandparent visitation order only where grandparent shows parent’s objections “are harmful to the 
child’s mental, physical, or emotional health”), applied in Flynn v. Henkel, 880 N.E.2d 166 (Ill. 
2007) and In re Anaya R., 2012 IL App (1st) 121101. Grandparent childcare differs from stepparent 
childcare in that only in the former will certain grandparents (i.e., parents of custodial parent of 
grandchild) remain in the child’s family and only in the later will there often have been child 
caretakers acting like, and recognized in the community and by the children, as parents, or at least 
quasiparents. 
203.  The Illinois Uniform Premarital Agreement Act, 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 10/4(8), recognizes 
premarital pacts can cover “personal rights and obligations, not in violation of public policy or a 
statute imposing a criminal penalty.”  At least some parental waivers of superior rights, as by 
stepparent adoptions, are not violative of the public policy and do not constitute crimes.  Premarital 
pacts, however, cannot adversely affect the “right of a child to support.”  750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
10/4(b).  While the Uniform Premarital and Marital Agreements Act, as of July, 2012, initially 
addresses only contracts involving “rights or obligations arising between spouses because of their 
marital status,” § 2(4), it later states that “a term . . . which defines the rights or duties of the parties 
regarding custodial responsibility [defined to include “legal custody, parenting time, access, 
visitation or other custodial right of duty”] is not binding on the court,” thus suggesting custodial 
responsibility pacts can be binding with judicial approval, § 10(a) and (c).  The Comment to § 10 
recognizes a court might consider a custodial responsibility pact “by way of guidance.”  See also In 
re Marriage of Neuchterlein, 225 Ill. App. 3d, 1, 7, 587 N.E.2d 21, 25 (Ill. App. 4th 1992) (premarital 
agreement to raise children born into marriage as Lutherans is not always enforceable, but the 
agreement may be considered “as a factor” in the “custody decision”). 
204.  See, e.g., Smith v. Carr, 2012 WL 3962904 (C.D. Cal. 2012) (exploring childcare pacts between the 
unwed in light of Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660 (1976), while recognizing a written agreement 
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precedent enforcing common law contracts on child support between 
unmarried opposite sex couples involving child support for children born of 
artificial insemination,205 an Illinois Appellate Court, in its second ruling in 
the T.P.S. case in October 2012, recognized common contract law and 
promissory estoppel claims involving possible childcare, as well as support, 
on behalf of a former same-sex female partner whose one-time mate 
conceived and bore a child via artificial insemination.206  Earlier decisions 
rejecting common law contract to adopt, and similar theories, were 
distinguished as not involving births by artificial insemination.207  While in 
T.P.S. there may not have been a formal adoption by the nonbirth mother 
because she and her mate were told that adoption was not legally possible,208 
the lack of an opportunity to adopt, or the mistaken belief that there was no 
opportunity to adopt, need not be dispositive.  While the Mancine appeals 
court chided Nicholas for sleeping on his adoption opportunity, his lack of 
parentage or nonparent childcare standing may well have come at great 
expense to William’s best interests. 
Beside adaptations of other state laws on de facto parents and 
stepparents, and beside newly recognized family relations contracts, 
guardianship appointments by courts209 could be more broadly available to 
                                                                                                                           
Custody of H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d 419, 434 (Wis. 1995) (“we conclude that public policy 
considerations do not prohibit a court from relying on its equitable powers to grant visitation apart 
from sec. 767.245 on the basis of a co-parenting agreement between a biological parent and another 
when visitation is in a child’s best interest”).  See also Christian R.H., 794 N.W.2d 230, 233-34 n.7 
(while there is common law authority to order child “visitation,” there is no non-statutory authority 
to confer “parental rights”).   
  In Illinois already, when certain children are not born of sex, but of assisted reproduction, 
certain parents can contract under statute to become parents though they have no biological ties.  
See, e.g., 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 40/3(a) (upon consent husband of artificially inseminated wife will 
often be “treated in law as if he were the natural father of a child thereby conceived” even if he was 
not the semen donor) and 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 47/20(b) (two people can become parents under an 
agreement governed by the Gestational Surrogacy Act if one contributes “at least one of the gametes 
resulting in a pre-embryo that the gestational surrogate will attempt to carry to term”). 
205.  In re Parentage of M.J., 203 Ill.2d 526, 541, 787 N.E.2d 144, 152 (2003). 
206.  In re T.P.S., 2012 IL App (5th) 120176. 
207.  Id. at ¶ 11.  Outside of Illinois comparable contracts involving children not born of sex are also 
validated at times under common law principles.  See, e.g., S.N. v. M.B., 935 N.E.2d 463 (Ohio Ct. 
App. 2010) (common law guidelines on enforceable surrogacy contracts).  At other times common 
law contracts are unenforceable.  See, e.g., Family Law–Unmarried Couples–Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court Holds That A Former Domestic Partner Need Not Fulfill Promises to 
Support A Child Born After the Relationship Has Dissolved. - T.F. v. B.L., 813 N.E.2, 118 HARV. L. 
REV. 1039 (2005) (noting the tensions between T.F. v. B.L., 813 N.E.2d 1244 (Mass. 2004) (no 
support obligation for nonbirth mother for child born of artificial insemination arising from implied 
contract between same-sex  female couple); E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 711 N.E.2d 886 (Mass. 1999) (“de 
facto” parenthood recognized in same-sex partner who sought child visitation). 
208.  T.P.S., 2012 IL App (5th) 120176, Brief of Amicus Curiae National Association of Social Workers 
and Its Illinois Chapter in Support of Petitioner-Appellant Catherine D.W. (the non-birth mother), 
June 4, 2012, at 4. 
209.  Court-appointed guardians thus differ from folks like Nicholas whose girlfriends/wives name them 








establish childcare standing for stepparents.  In its initial ruling in the T.P.S. 
case, a lesbian partner, who had been appointed guardian of each of the two 
children born to her then mate, was allowed to seek continuation of the 
guardianships under the Illinois Probate Act once the two women ended their 
relationship.210  The birth mother’s earlier consents to guardianship overcame 
the presumptions of superior parental rights,211 giving her former partner “a 
cognizable interest” in the children’s welfare.212  To end the guardianship, 
the court held the birth mother would need to show by a preponderance of 
the evidence “a material change in the circumstances,” unless the guardian 
“establishes, by clear and convincing evidence that termination of the 
guardianship would not be in the best interests” of the child.213   
Therefore, guardianships, whether through new statutes or case 
precedents utilizing “implied” probate authority, 214 could lead to childcare 
standing for stepparents.  Such orders would always need to serve the basic 
goal of the Probate Code, the promotion of the best interests of the ward.215 
The opportunities for nonparents to be designated child guardians, if not 
parents, and thereafter obtain judicially-authorized childcare over parental 
objections, have already been increased in Illinois.216  Today, even without 
parental consent, a guardian may be appointed for a minor where there is no 
living parent “who is willing and able to make and carry-out day-to-day 
childcare decisions concerning the minor” or where “the parent or parents 
voluntarily relinquished physical custody of the minor.”217 
                                                                                                                           
Mancine, 2012 IL App. (1st) 111138, ¶¶ 4-5 (Nicholas named sole guardian of William by Miki, as 
reflected in adoption agent’s report of February 27, 2009 involving Miki’s proposed adoption of 
William; the adoption was finalized in March 2009). 
210.  T.P.S., 2012 IL App (5th) 120176, ¶ 18. 
211.  Id. at ¶ 17. 
212.  Id. at ¶ 17. 
213.  Id. at ¶ 16 (quoting the Probate Act provision, effective January 1, 2011, found at 755 ILL. COMP. 
STAT. 5/11-14.1(b)).  It should be noted that when the T.P.S. case returned to the appeals court after 
a remand, about sixteen months later, the court—in an opinion authored by a Justice who had not 
participated in the initial ruling—focused on common law contract and promissory estoppel theories, 
and not on the co-guardianship agreements, to recognize the nonbiologial and nonadoptive parent’s 
standing to seek childrearing.  Id. at ¶ 61. 
214.  See, e.g., Karbin v. Karbin, 2012 IL 112815 ¶ 32 (“implied” authority under Probate Code for 
guardian of “disabled” adult to seek a marriage dissolution on behalf of the ward).  But see In re 
M.M., 156 Ill.2d 53, 63-64, 619 N.E. 2d 702, 709-10 (1993) (“implied” guardianship authority, 
empowering child guardians to consent to adoptions allowing continuing contacts with biological 
parents and their families, is not recognized;  here there must be express statutory authority since 
“traditional common law” powers cannot be transcended);  In re C.C., 2011 IL 111795, ¶ 41 
(guardianship statute applied “as written;” courts should not “carve out exceptions that do not appear 
in the statute simply because” courts “do not like how the statute applies in a given case”). 
215.  Karbin, 2012 IL 112815, ¶ 52. 
216.  In re Guardianship of Tatyanna T., 2012 IL App (1st) 112957, ¶¶ 20-27. 
217.  Id. at ¶20 (citing 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-5(b) (2010), which establishes a rebuttable presumption 
that a parent can make and carry out childcare decisions, where the presumption can be overcome” 
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An easy, but significant, first initiative for expanding stepparent 
childcare standing would be an amendment to the current stepparent statute 
to recognize greater opportunities for stepparents to attain parental status 
and/or broader opportunities for stepparents to attain nonparent childcare 
standing.  In either setting, respect for an adoptive or biological parent’s 
superior rights requires more than “a thinned-out conception” of a 
childcaretaker with childcare standing; parental consent must also be 
rigorously examined.218  Enforcing certain premarital or midmarital pacts on 
child caretaking between single parents and soon-to-be or current stepparents 
would also insure that necessary respect for superior parental rights. 
2.  New Conditional Stepparent Childcare Interests 
Even if a former stepparent has no unconditional childcare 
opportunities in a former stepchild upon dissolution, he or she nevertheless 
might also be afforded contingent interests, even without any adoption, 
guardianship, or the like.  What if a single parent like Miki in the Mancine 
case died, or placed William for adoption, a day after her divorce from 
Nicholas?  Then, there would be no one with superior parental rights219 
though William’s best interests would be well served by permitting Nicholas 
to care for the child.  Here, a special de facto (or comparable) parenthood 
doctrine governing former stepparents could be made contingent upon a 
single parent’s death or child relinquishment within a short time of 
dissolution where the stepparent had developed a “substantial relationship” 
with the stepchild220 and the child’s best interests would be served. 221  In an 
Illinois childcare proceeding today, upon a single parent’s death, “a person 
other than a parent” can seek custody of a child who “is not in the physical 
custody of one of his parents.”222  There is today no special statute (or 
                                                                                                                           
218.  Robin Fretwell Wilson, Trusting Mothers: A Critique of the American Law Institute’s Treatment of 
DeFacto Parents, 38 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1103, 1109 (2010) (warning against “a thinned-out 
conception of parenthood” that is “primarily a function of co-residence” and that “would give former 
live-in partners access to a child” even when opposed by the legal parent, “nearly always a child’s 
mother”), employed in In re Custody of B.M.H., 315 P.3d 470, 486 (Wash. 2013) (Madsen, C.J., 
concurring dissenting). 
219.  See, e.g., In re A.P.P., 251 P.3d 127, 129 (Mont. 2011) (parental interest recognized in stepfather 
after child’s mother died, where substantial evidence established that father “engaged in conduct 
contrary to the child-parent relationship”). 
220.  Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 76-77 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment). 
221.  Comparably, at times when a parent places a child for adoption with a certain couple, that parent 
can later seek renewed custody if the adoption fails.  Here the termination of parental rights is 
contingent.  See, e.g., A.D.R. v. J.L.H., 994 So.2d 177 (Miss. 2008).  As well when a designated 
adopting person or couple (like the grandparents) die, at times a parent may not be able to resurrect 
fully her superior rights, but might be given an opportunity to reclaim custody, as upon a showing 
by clear and convincing evidence that custody is in the child’s best interests.  See, e.g., D.M. v. D.R., 
62 So.2d 920 (Miss. 2011). 








presumption) favoring a former stepparent.223  But, there is a statute 
mandating “visitation rights” for the grandparents, regardless of their earlier 
childcare, “unless it is shown that such visitation would be detrimental to the 
best interests and welfare of the minor.”224  Furthermore, there is a statute 
allowing grandparents, great-grandparents, and siblings (including 
stepbrothers and stepsisters) to petition for visitation with a minor child, one 
year or older, if “there is an unreasonable denial of visitation by a parent” 
and “the child’s other parent is deceased or has been missing for at least 3 
months” or the child has been born out of wedlock to parents who are not 
living together.225  Why favor grandparents and stepsiblings—who likely 
never acted like parents—over stepparents, like Nicholas—who likely acted 
as parents?   
If a parent was to place a child for adoption a day after a divorce, a 
former stepparent would not receive any notice of the placement for adoption 
since notice is required today only for “any person who is openly living with 
the child or the child’s mother at the time the proceeding is initiated and who 
is holding himself out to be the child’s father.”226  So, if postdissolution Miki 
                                                                                                                           
223.  See, e.g., 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-3(a) (2005); 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 11-5(a), (a-1), (b) (2012) 
(guardianship qualifications when legal parents are not available include a “best interest” test and 
no preference for a former stepparent, or “de facto” parent, with perhaps some preference for one 
who is designated in writing by a parent or parents as a guardian should the parent or parents die).  
Any special statute need not necessarily grant standing to a former stepparent to seek a childcare 
order; it may grant simply a right to be heard, with an opportunity to seek standing later in order to 
pursue renewed custody/visitation.  See, e.g., 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/1-5(2)(a) (any “relative 
caregiver” “has the right to be heard” in a child neglect and shelter proceeding, though not the right 
to be a party, 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/1-5(1)).  For a review of American state laws on parental 
testamentary appointments of child guardians, see Alyssa A. DiRusso and S. Kristen Peters, 
Parental Testamentary Appointments of Guardians for Children, 25 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. (2012) 
(urging statutory reforms so that parental wishes will more likely be followed). 
  Not only is there no special statute on former stepparents, but also there are times when former 
stepparents seem excluded from possible consideration for undertaking the care of a former 
stepchild.  See, e.g., 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. 505/7(b) (Department of Children and Family Services 
may consider a child’s placement with a relative, who includes “the child’s step-father, step-mother 
or adult step-brother or step-sister,” but not a former step-father or step-mother). 
224.  755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-7.1 (statute also recognizes “reasonable visitation rights may be granted 
to any other relative of the minor or other person having an interest in the welfare of the child”).  
New grandparent visits also arise upon the death of a parent when the grandparents had earlier 
secured visits during a marriage dissolution proceeding and later seek to modify the divorce court 
order.  See, e.g., Moreno v. Perez, 363 S.W.3d 725 (Tex. App. - Houston 1st 2011). 
  As well, grandparents, upon the death of parents, can easily acquire custody of their 
grandchildren via guardianship appointments when the deceased parents provided for such custody 
in written instruments.  See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. 75-5-202.5 (no notice required to anyone before 
appointment becomes effective), applied in In re Guardianship of A.T.I.G., 293 P.3d 276 (Utah 
2012). 
225.  750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/607 (a-3) and (a-5)(1)(A-5) and (E). 
226.  750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 50/7C(e)(2013).  As there was a baptism record, see also 750 ILL. COMP. 
STAT. 50/7(f) (notice required to one “identified as the child’s father by the mother in a written, 
sworn statement”).  As to the need for Nicholas’ consent to any later adoption by another, consider 
750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 50/8(b)(vi) (consent to adoption of child over six months required of “father” 
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had a new intimate partner with whom she lived, that partner might have 
standing, but not the fit and loving Nicholas.  Here too, as in death, a special 
statute could protect certain stepparents and their children. 
A stepparent’s failure to adopt formally a single parent spouse’s child, 
for whatever reason, causes both the stepparent and the child to lose any 
chance to pursue a continuing familial relationship upon a single parent’s 
death or upon placement for adoption, regardless of the child’s best interest. 
Yet in many parental rights termination settings, bad acting parents get 
second chances, as where parent-child reunification obligations are imposed 
on the state and where there is no termination of parental rights unless a 
child’s best interest is served.227  So, many marginal parents maintain their 
superior rights notwithstanding their earlier parenting failures and their 
children’s contrary interests.  But stepparents and their stepchildren can see 
their loving families crumble if former stepparents and their ex-spouses no 
longer get along for whatever reason. 
The Proposed MDM Act recognizes some standing for current 
stepparents, former stepparents and others who childcared should a parent 
die or place a child for adoption.  However, many significant caregivers 
remain without voices under the proposal’s guidelines on “allocation of 
parental responsibilities.”228  The proposal recognizes both a legal parent, 
defined as “a biological or adoptive parent,”229 and an “equitable parent,” 
defined as one who is not a legal parent, but who is obligated by court order 
to pay child support; is a stepparent; lived with the child for at least two years 
and reasonably believed he or she was “the child’s biological parent;” or 
“lived with the child since the child’s birth or for at least 2 years, and held 
himself out as the child’s parent . . . under an agreement with the child’s legal 
parent” or legal parents.230  As a stepparent includes one “who was married 
to a legal parent,”231 the proposed Act could help a former stepparent, as an 
“equitable parent,” should a parent die.  The proposal allows an equitable 
parent to file a petition for allocation of parental responsibilities if “a legal 
                                                                                                                           
50/8(a)(2) (consent not required, however, when the father is neither “the biological or adoptive 
father of the child”).  Even if Nicholas’ consent is deemed required under this provision, the power 
to veto is undercut as there is no explicit duty to give Nicholas any notice. Also see 50 ILL. COMP. 
STAT. 50/14.5(a) (former parent, where parental rights were terminated due to unfitness, can petition 
to adopt former child). 
227.  See, e.g., In re Destiny R., 2011 WL 3930352 (Conn. 2011); In re J.G., 2013 IL App (2d) 130645-
U (guardianship of minor born with cocaine in her system in state immediately after birth, with 
mother then deemed “unfit or unable” to childcare; five years later, after significant attempts to 
reunite mother and child, mother’s parental rights are terminated).  See also 50 ILL. COMP. STAT.  
50/14.5(a) (former parent, whose parental rights were terminated due to unfitness, can petition to 
adopt former child). 
228.  Proposed MDM Act, codified at 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/600. 
229.  Id. 
230.  Id. 








parent is deceased or disabled and cannot perform caretaking functions with 
respect to the child.”232   
Should a single parent die soon after divorce, a former stepparent, and 
even a former stepparent’s parent, often fares better outside Illinois in a 
childcare setting than a former stepparent in Illinois.  For example, if a parent 
died in Arizona, a former stepparent could obtain custody of a child if he or 
she stood “in loco parentis,”233 it would be “significantly detrimental” for the 
child to be placed in a second parent’s custody,234 and there is “clear and 
convincing evidence that awarding custody” to the second parent is not in the 
child’s “best interests.”235  If a single parent died in Utah,236 a former 
stepparent237 could seek custody or visitation with a former stepchild by 
showing, inter alia, intentional assumption of “the role and obligations of a 
parent;” “an emotional bond” and “a parent-child type relationship;” 
emotional or financial contribution to the child’s wellbeing; and the child’s 
best interests.238 
As well, should a parent place a child for adoption outside of Illinois 
soon after divorce, a former stepparent, or even his or her parent, sometimes 
fares better, as where each is afforded preferential standing as a prospective 
adopter.  In Utah, when a child is placed for adoption, while a married 
opposite sex couple is preferred, a child may be placed “with a person who 
has already developed a substantial relationship with the child.”239 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Former stepparents with no formal adoptive ties who have developed 
“familial bonds” with their stepchildren in Illinois should have greater 
nonparent childcare standing, if not superior parental rights.  Additional 
special statutory guidelines are preferred,240 including statutes directed to 
                                                                                                                           
232.  Id. at 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/601.2(b)(2). 
233.  ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. 25-415(A)(1).  This status is achieved by being “treated as a parent by the 
child” and forming “a meaningful parental relationship with the child for a substantial period of 
time.”  ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. 25-415(G)(1). 
234.  ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. 25-415(A)(2). 
235.  ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. 25-415(B).  If not custody, Nicholas could be awarded “reasonable 
visitation” on a lesser showing. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. 25-415(C) (“in loco parentis” and “best 
interests”).  
236.  UTAH CODE ANN. 30-5a-103(2)(g)(1) (a parent’s death would need to have him or her deemed 
“absent”). 
237.  UTAH CODE ANN. 30-5a-102(2)(d) and (e) (former step-parent and step-grandparent). 
238.  UTAH CODE ANN. 30-5a-103(2)(a), (b), (c) and (e).  
239.  UTAH CODE ANN. 78B-6-117(4)(c).  See also In re Adoption of I.M., 288 P.3d 864 (Kan. App. 
2012) (former stepparent could not adopt child via “second-parent option” afforded stepparent; court 
is reluctant to allow adoption where statutory language is “clear and unambiguous”). 
240.  The desirability of greater certainty and comprehensive coverage, as well as separation of powers 
concerns, suggest guidelines should normally originate in statutes.  See, e.g., Kitchen v. Kitchen, 
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former stepparents as parents and to former stepparents eligible for nonparent 
childcare standing.  As occurs in other family settings, like premarital and 
open adoption pacts,241 certain family-related agreements on childcare also 
deserve recognition.242   
Expanded childcare opportunities for former stepparents could also be 
generally recognized within laws governing childcare when a parent 
facilitated familial bonds with a nonparent and when family bond 
preservation furthers the child’s best, or perhaps compelling, interest, even 
over the objection of the parent.243  Without a special stepparent statute, 
preservation of familial bonds can be secured for a former stepparent and 
stepchild through either an expanded definition of legal parenthood or an 
expanded opportunity for judicially-monitored childcare by a nonparent, 
including a former stepparent.  The Proposed Parentage Act and Proposed 
MDM Act take small steps in the right direction.  But even with them, more 
statutory (and some common law) will be needed to promote additional 
familial love for deserving children and the stepparents who have cared for 
and loved them.  The Illinois General Assembly should recognize a broader 
array of “established familial or family-like bonds”244 and expressly 
authorize judicial action on behalf of former stepparents and stepchildren, as 
courts will often “decline to go where the legislature has not led.”245 Should 
                                                                                                                           
father’s objection where the mother had died, court recognizes grandparent visitation standing has 
come by statute, former stepparent visitation standing has come by precedent, and former foster 
parent visitation standing has been rejected by precedent). 
241.  But see, Bix, supra, note 166, at 19 (recognizing that in all these areas, “a significant part of the 
resistance to private ordering comes from legitimate concerns that courts and legislatures have in 
protecting vulnerable parties, as well as reasonable worries regarding the long-term societal effects 
of (encouraging) altered forms of marital or parental status”).  One example prompting such 
resistance is PENN. STAT. 2733(a) (“A prospective adoptive parent of a child may enter into an 
agreement with a birth relative of the child to permit continuing contact or communication between 
the child and the birth relative or between the adoptive parent and the birth relative.”).  Yet private 
ordering is here to stay, as demonstrated by the ever increasing childcare opportunities for non-
genetic and non-adoptive parents and nonparent child caretakers.  Vulnerable parties (i.e., children) 
can be well-protected by continuing with close judicial scrutiny of proposed childcare or actual 
childcare. 
242.  In the absence of an express Illinois statute, agreements on future childcare opportunities between 
parents and nonparents (including former stepparents, grandparents, former cohabitants, and others 
—like aunts and uncles) where the nonparents seek later childcare opportunities over parental 
objections seemingly must utilize the narrow range of common law precedents on equitable estoppel 
of the parents.  Precedents deem such agreements important, if not dispositive, where there is shown 
detrimental reliance, earlier judicial recognition of the agreements, children’s best interests, and, 
perhaps, harm to children.  See, e.g., Engelkens, 821 N.E.2d at 804-806 (distinguishing Schlam, 648 
N.E.2d at 349-50).  Here, unlike potential childcare opportunities for certain former stepparents 
without agreements, childcare standing seems best developed through common law precedents. 
243.  See, e.g., Sides v. Ikner, 730 S.E.2d 844 (N.C. App. 2012) (need to look at legal parents’ conduct 
and intentions, not just nonparent acts, to insure protection of rights emanating from “paramount 
parental status”). 
244.  Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 88 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 








the General Assembly fail to act, there should be incremental common law 
developments preserving “substantial”246 stepparent-child relationships247  
while respecting superior parental rights. 
 
                                                                                                                           
246.  Troxel, 530 U.S. at 76-77 (Souter, J.). 
247.  See, e.g., In re Custody of A.F.J., 314 P.3d 373 (Wash. 2013) (where legislature has taken no action 
in response to common law de facto parent developments, legislative approval of continuing 
common law rulings is inferred). 
